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One advantage Panama will have over Suez will be in the coaling rates. We can sell coal at Panama for $5 a ton, or a trifle less, whereas $6 a ton is the prevailing rate at Suez. This saving will go far toward paying for the passage of a ship through the canal. For instance, a ship leaving New York, or Liverpool, would take on only enough coal to run to Panama, where a fresh supply could be obtained, and thus room that otherwise would be filled with coal for the whole journey may be used for additional freight. The same saving to ships will be experienced in securing all kinds of supplies from the government at Panama, while dry docks and other facilities will be available.

Col. Goethals has displayed a high order of business acumen in guiding the government into this policy. The advantage to the United States lies in the fact that other nations will not have to establish coaling stations and repairing facilities on the pretense of caring for their merchant marine, and so lead into a possible infringement of the Monroe doctrine. An incidental benefit of the policy, though decidedly one worth while, lies in the fact that our coal mines will find a great market at Panama through the practice of selling to ships. The government will not have private competition, because private capital could not operate on the margin of profit that will satisfy the government.

The rapid development of South America is the surest promise of a commerce that will make the canal economically profitable. The business that originates
there and our own expanding foreign trade will be
great feeders of the canal, not considering Europe,
Asia, Africa, and Australasia.

As the United States becomes more thickly popu-
lated the overflow will go largely to the South. With
the practical proof afforded at Panama that health
can be maintained in a tropical climate, Americans
more and more will swarm to South and Central
America. Hundreds of canal employees have gone
into business in the tropical countries rather than re-
turn to the harsher climate and sterner industrial
competition of the United States. South America,
however, is not the place for the man with small cap-
itl such as the United States has been. The cultiva-
tion of the staple products, such as bananas, coconuts,
coffee, cocoa, sugar, rubber trees, etc., is precarious
on a small scale because great monopolies dominate
these industries and crush individual enterprise. Syn-
dicate operations on a large scale are the only suc-
cessful means of business promotion, though here and
there the prospector strikes a good thing. For men
of ability who are willing to work as employees there
are many good openings in Latin America.

The Americans have a great deal to learn from the
older nations of Europe in order to make the most
of their natural advantage in South American mar-
kets. Our merchandise is more attractive to the Latin
American because usually it is smarter in design and
appearance, though frequently inferior in quality, and
simply because the United States dazzles the Southern
imagination. The Germans and the English are past
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masters in getting foreign business. They send out salesmen who speak the native languages, and when they make shipments it is in a manner most convenient to the peculiar conditions of the particular country.

Your American manufacturer or exporter gets the biggest box he can find and puts as much into it as it will hold. Frequently the big box is broken when it is unloaded at the South American port, occasioning trouble to the consignee. Often the shipment is consigned to some interior point to which a mule pack train is the only means of transportation. This occasions more trouble and expense to the purchaser. The Germans do things differently. They pack their merchandise in small packages and in durable boxes, knowing that it may have to be handled over mountain passes by hand or muleback. They have a regard to the high temperature and the character of the merchandise so that it may not spoil. But these are not insuperable faults upon the part of the Americans, and already they are being eliminated intelligently after bitter experience. In nearly all our Eastern or seaport cities every exporting office has a Spanish-speaking attaché to conduct correspondence in the language of its Southern customers.

Among the agencies at work to bring Americans to a realization of the opportunities that lie in plentiful profusion in South and Central America none is more ably and successfully managed than the Bureau of American Republics, in Washington, with John Barrett as Director-General. The most striking fea-
tute of Mr. Barrett's work is the statesmanlike plane on which he seeks to interest Americans in the twenty republics to the South. Get business is his motto, but get it by straightforward, respectful, and enduring methods. The constant aim of the Bureau is to abolish the foolish opinions Americans have entertained about the business, social, and political capacities of Latin Americans. They are not the comic-opera revolutionist type at which we laugh on Broadway. They are cultured people who expect to be approached as gentlemen, and the periodic fighting that attends a change in administration in some Central American countries does not gainsay that fact.

Mr. Barrett edits a monthly Bulletin which already is in the most wide-awake American exporting offices, and should be in the hands of every business head who directly or indirectly touches South American commerce. Printed as it is in English and Spanish, it is serving to remove many prejudices by making closer acquaintances. An impartial monthly review of all subjects of real interest, industrial, political, and general, enables its readers to keep in touch authoritatively with Latin America. In view of the forebodings some of the Southern republics have had at the possible territorial expansion of the United States at their expense, this Bureau under Mr. Barrett is doing an inestimably valuable service to American business interests by its sympathetic and tactful policy.

The dynamic expansion of American industrial life is the one overshadowing fact in the Western Hemisphere, as indeed it is in the whole world. It is a
new kind of conquest, not preceded by the sword, and if we maintain our moral poise will not be followed by any other than happy results to the conquered. English is destined to be the sole language of the Western world. American merchandise will form the bulk of its commerce. American citizens will be found in every out-of-the-way corner of the two continents, carrying with them, even if in diminished luster, the ideals and abilities which have made the nation eclipse all records thus early in its youth. The Panama Canal marks our passage from unfledged provincialism to the full stature of national manhood among the industrial activities of the nations of the world.
CHAPTER XXI

SETTLING OUR ACCOUNT WITH COLOMBIA

The American people, like the Israelites of old, are a peculiar people, chosen of God to fulfill a high destiny among the nations of the world.

Whether it was a good thing for Puritanism to be set down in the lap of material luxury on the North American continent is not yet disclosed, although we have abundant evidence of the struggle, already sharply drawn, between the spiritual and materialistic forces in the national character.

The Civil War was an even mightier conflict, between the Puritan and Cavalier, than Marston Moor and Naseby. In it the Puritan triumphed even more gloriously. In it the Puritan was clinching the principles of the great English struggle. He was stamping out the embers of the unspiritual forces in Anglo-Saxon character.

Our unparalleled material prosperity is at work to revive the spirit of the Cavalier and to dull the keen edge of Puritanism. Righteousness never has flourished under great material prosperity. The cocksure feeling, that comes from the possession of much worldly goods, is beginning to appear in the external and internal actions of the American nation. The letter of “In God We Trust” remains unimpaired on our currency, but its Puritanic spirit has weakened
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perceptibly. We are depending on a big navy to see us through.

Probably no war ever was fought with more disinterested motives than the Spanish-American War. The Americans seemed to relish the opportunity to lay aside the rich pursuits of commercialism for a while to exercise the old spiritual forces of the Puritan. The dash and vitality of that outburst caused Europe to think deeply.

But the Spanish-American War had one result that shows the American people are measurably less determined in their spiritual conceptions than the generation of '65. We kept the Philippines, much as the warriors of Israel kept the plunder of the Philistines when they had been commanded sternly not to make their cause one of material aggrandizement.

Our treatment of the Filipinos has been as unparalleled in its humanitarianism as our conduct in the war that gave them to us. But that is our way of assuaging our conscience for holding them, a sugar-coating process to make the act pass muster. Down in our national heart we know we are holding the Philippines for what they ultimately will mean to us materially, not what we can do for them spiritually. If the ten million Filipinos were in the Southern States, where we could see them and feel the pulsation of democratic forces, and not seven thousand miles away, we would fight another Civil War over them, just as we did over the Negro.

All of this by way of introduction to the act that gave us the Canal Zone. We have the admission of
the President himself that he abandoned the regular diplomatic methods of securing the territory needed for building a canal in favor of the primitive method of taking it by force. This leads straight to the admission that we set up the Republic of Panama merely to make an otherwise bald steal appear to bear some evidence of justification. It has been shown in a previous chapter that the revolution that gave the Republic its independence was made a success by the United States.

So far, the national conscience has not stirred itself greatly over this act. At least it has not stirred itself decisively, and that is another proof that the Puritan spirit is taking itself much less seriously than it did so short a time ago as 1898. One reason has been that the American people only recently have begun to get the true understanding of what did happen at Panama. President Roosevelt exerted the full capacities of his versatile mind to cloud the situation, so that the moral sense of the people would not be aroused, until it would be too late to undo his act.

He pretended that the treatment Panama had received, as a kind of stepchild of Colombia, warranted the same kind of action we took to free Cuba. His Secretary of State advanced the strained construction of our solemn treaty with Colombia that we were under obligation to maintain the neutrality of the Panama Railroad, and so prevent the soldiers of Colombia from striking down the revolution. The President further recognized the independence of the Republic, and insisted that it was an act as disinter-
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ested, for instance, as our recognition of the new Republic of China. In truth, they bear no similarity of feature.

In China the masses of the people were trying to demonstrate an advance in their understanding of government to the point where authority would be recognized as inherent in them, and not an external imposition by an alien line of Emperors. In Panama the masses of the people not only did not know about the revolution until it had passed, but no more than an ordinary mob, such as may be aroused on an hour’s notice in any city, participated in it.

It was not necessary that the people of Panama should know about it. The United States had agreed to stand between the clique of Panaman financiers and any offensive act Colombia might undertake. Undoubtedly there had been popular uprisings against Colombia in Panama, but the revolution of November 3, 1903, was not one of them. This revolution had three sources of inspiration—The French Canal Company, the capitalist Junta in Panama, and Theodore Roosevelt’s desire to get a canal started before his inherited administration should end.

In this review of the canal President Roosevelt’s action in taking Panama has been approved. It is approved as an international act of eminent domain. Where criticism is directed is at our refusal to pay for what we took. The $10,000,000 we paid Panama was a moral quibble, as may be illustrated.

Any American railroad, or any municipality, county or State, may exercise the right of eminent domain
to secure property in its right of way, or necessary to their well being. But property so taken must be paid for at a fair valuation to the rightful owner.

The rightful owner of the territory we desired for a canal was Colombia. When we took that territory we took it from Colombia. The way we took it was to participate in a bogus revolution, engineered by a Junta of wealthy Panaman business and professional men. It turned out that the part they played in making the revolution a success was farcical, while the part the United States Marines played was vital.

The Marines at first had orders not to allow either Colombian or revolutionary troops to use the railroad. When this order was issued the revolution had not started. Besides, there were no revolutionists after it did start on the Atlantic side to use the railroad, except a handful of the hirelings of the Junta. The second order the Marines received was that Colombia would not be allowed to settle the revolution by force.

In two days the United States recognized the independence of a republic thus created. Twelve days later it had signed a treaty with this republic guaranteeing that Colombia would not be allowed to recover possession. The treaty recited that the United States was to be ceded a Canal Zone in consideration of this guarantee.

There we have the facts in the "taking" of Panama. What we did was to help the Panama capitalist Junta to steal the Isthmus from Colombia, then, in the division of spoils, we obtained a Canal Zone. The $10,000,000 to the new republic was part of the ad-
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administration's efforts to create an appearance of regularity in the proceedings. It was meant to ease the national conscience—not the administration's conscience.

Anyone who will spend a month in Panama will discover that the republic would not stand from supper until breakfast if it were not for the supporting arm of the United States. It has become rather a burdensome task, too, as our interference three times with Marines to keep the government from toppling over proves. This is not because the Panamans are inferior to any other Central American peoples. It is because there is not sufficient inherent vitality in so tiny a republic to hold it up alone.

If any American railroad should desire property for a right of way and, instead of condemning it by due process of law, should connive with a neighbor to falsely claim possession of the property and then buy the property from the illegal owner, the action not only would not stand in law but it would outrage public opinion. That precisely is the course we followed at Panama. President Roosevelt did not dare to take the property outright from Colombia, the compensation to be fixed by due process afterward, but connived with a revolutionary Junta, through his Secretary of State, to have the property claimed by a Republic to be set up specifically for that purpose, which Republic would sell the property to the United States.

The whole thing was done with the Rooseveltian dash that won frequently by sheer momentum. Eight
years later, believing it to be a closed incident, President Roosevelt confesses: "I took Panama and left Congress to debate the matter afterwards." There is a deal of contempt for the acumen of Congress in that remark, and looking back at the way Congress swallowed the incident, it is merited contempt.

It is a closed incident so far as the territory comprised in the Canal Zone is concerned. The issue to-day only is this: Have the American people enough of the old Puritanic righteousness left to insure that if a clear case of national wrongdoing is proved they will make reparation?

Colombia cannot compel reparation, nor can Europe. When we consider Germany and France quarreling over the spoils of Morocco, Italy taking Tripoli, England and Russia partitioning Persia, and Japan annexing Korea, what is left of The Hague to sit in judgment upon the action of the United States in Panama?

Absolutely nothing will compel the United States to do justice—except the still, small voice of national conscience. The action of the Minister from Colombia in declining an invitation to Secretary Knox to visit Colombia, in the spring of 1912, is the limit of Colombia's ability to protest.

But it ought to be set down as a maxim of canal management, if not of national policy, that no neighbor of the canal should be allowed to remain on bad terms with the Americans. It is not good that a nation so near as Colombia should be in a hostile frame of mind toward the United States. This is
true, not so much for what a sense of injustice rankling in the minds of her citizens might precipitate, but because, if anything happened to the canal, Colombia, in the event blame was not promptly fixed, inevitably would have to bear the burden of our suspicion.

There is still doubt as to whether Spain set off the mine that wrecked the Maine, but that did not keep Spain from taking the consequences. So with the canal. If it should be disabled without a clear cause or responsibility, the jingo in the United States would point to Colombia as one with a grudge. Thus, the bad feeling engendered in the taking of Panama might precipitate the mighty United States, in a fit of national passion, upon an innocent nation, more sinned against than sinning.

But, ultimately, the question of reparation must rest squarely upon a moral issue. It is not so much the rights of Colombia that should impel us to an act of reparation as a desire to live up to our own best instincts. The American ideal is something far different from law-compelled righteousness; it rises to the grandeur of righteousness for the sake of righteousness. Colombia suffered materially by our act, but we have suffered morally, and an enlightened judgment would be that we suffer the most.

Is it compatible with the dignity of a great nation like the United States to reverse its position by making reparation? This question more properly should read, Is it compatible with the pride of a great nation like the United States to make reparation? The an-
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swer is: The United States has no dignity to uphold. It may restore its dignity and sense of righteousness only by reversing its wilful and headstrong action. We merely play the ostrich in sticking our national head into the sand of the Panama revolution and fancy our action is hid.

There are three courses open to the United States. The first is to consider the acquisition of the Canal Zone a closed incident and decline discussion or reparation. The second is to pay Colombia a cash indemnity for the loss of her richest province. The third is to make reparation by restoration.

Manifestly, the first course involves national dishonor. This is true even if it has become an international fad for strong nations to pillage the weak ones. The second course would involve the arbitration of Colombia’s claim and a payment by the United States in some form for the adjudicated damage. Naturally, in such an event, the excuse for the continued existence of the Republic of Panama would vanish, unless after paying for the whole territory we should make the Republic’s title clear by gift.

The third course involves the restoration to Colombia of the territory comprised in the Republic of Panama, except the Canal Zone. It also would involve some cash indemnity equal to the loss of revenues during the nine years of separation, minus the improvements made by the United States. Article XXIV of our treaty with the Republic of Panama seems to have contemplated some such contingency as
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this, as we note the fine hand of Secretary Hay in the following:

"If the Republic of Panama shall hereafter enter as a constituent into any Government, or into any union or Confederation of States, so as to merge her sovereignty or independence in such government, union or confederation, the rights of the United States under this convention shall not be in any respect lessened or impaired."

In other words, if we should restore Panama to Colombia, less the Canal Zone, which ostensibly was all we wanted, the point to be arbitrated would be the value of the Canal Zone. It would be necessary, of course, as the foregoing article provides, that all our privileges under the present treaty with Panama should be binding if the province returned to the sovereignty of Colombia. Those privileges include the vital right to use any rivers or lands in the Republic that may be necessary to the construction, maintenance, operation, or defense of the canal.

Colombia would regain control of a province vastly improved since the separation. The cities of Panama and Colon have been made into modern cities by the Americans. Of the $10,000,000 we paid to Panama, about $6,000,000 remains unexpended and invested in New York real estate. This would revert to Colombia, as well as the improvements made with the portion expended. Whatever loss in revenues during the
separation that Colombia might claim would not be a material consideration to the United States.

Undoubtedly under such an arrangement provision would have to be made whereby the old order of things that existed prior to the revolution should not recur. The United States could not tolerate a turbulent situation on the banks of the canal. It still would have to retain the plenary powers in respect of sanitation and order that exist under the present treaty. This doubtless would be the hitch that would come in attempting such a solution.

The people of Panama, remembering the old days, and keen in the enjoyment of conditions as created and maintained by the United States, probably would object to any solution that gave Colombia renewed sovereignty. It would be far less of an exercise of arbitrary power to overrule this objection than it was to set the republic up in 1903. In whatever solution that may be selected some authoritative actions will be necessary.

Those Americans who balk at the prospect of a large money indemnity to Colombia, for taking Panama, should ask themselves whether any mere love of lucre should stand between us and a clean conscience. The situation in which we are involved may cost dearly to straighten out, but that is the inevitable price, in the individual or national life, of walking in the paths of unrighteousness. The Colombian claim is a call to arms between the forces of good and evil in the American national character. Do we stand at Armageddon, and do we battle for the Lord?
CHAPTER XXII

THE MONROE DOCTRINE

It is to be doubted if so lion-hearted a policy ever was announced by so weak a people as the principle that is involved in the Monroe doctrine, promulgated in 1823. That it should have stood all the years prior to our attainment of the physical strength to make it good, is proof that its real vitality lies in the truth that it expresses rather than in the battleships we can summon to intimidate its acceptance.

To-day, more than ever, the American people need to study the spirit that prompted that declaration. The United States in recent years has been perilously near to just the violation of it that we prohibited to Europe. It is certain that if we ourselves ever step over its spirit we will need all the steel and powder this resourceful nation can command to hold Europe and Asia back; whereas, if we continue to interpret it aright, the land-hungry nations may look covetously upon the Western Hemisphere, but that same vital quality that restrained them in the days of our weakness will hold them back now.

The Monroe doctrine asserted that the principle of democracy, which had sought a haven in this Hemisphere, must not be pursued and persecuted by the institution of monarchy. The phraseology declared that the Americas must not henceforth be considered
a place for European colonization, but the spirit of the policy meant that two such irreconcilable systems of government as monarchy and democracy could not live side by side in the same hemisphere, and that the safety of democracy required the exclusion of monarchy.

In these latter days there has sprung up a tendency, not strongly developed as yet, to interpret that doctrine to mean that, while Europe and Asia must keep out, the United States is destined to dominate the whole situation. That instead of America for Americans, it means the Western Hemisphere for the United States.

It is certain that the nations of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea discern such a tendency in the actions of the United States. The United States looms up to them with a strength far more formidable than we are conscious of, and they fear the day when we grow conscious of that strength with a waning sense of Puritan justice.

The Spanish-American War was a revelation to them as it was to us. Far-sighted Latin Americans could read in that altruistic interference in their affairs the forerunner of interferences which might not be so altruistic. So far it substantially is true that we have not interfered anywhere in Central or South America that it was not to the benefit of the nation involved.

When the United States executed the coup that rid Venezuela of Castro it did a service of inestimable value to that nation. When it rid Nicaragua of
Zelaya it did a similar service. In aiding Santo Domingo to straighten out its finances, in setting civil government upon its feet in Cuba, and in other instances of interference not so important, the Americans have played the rôle of disinterested friendship.

On the other hand, the manner in which we acquired the Canal Zone suddenly showed Latin America that, though Uncle Sam might bear the visage of a rector, he could just as readily play the rôle of a strong-arm man not overly scrupulous when he is selfishly impelled.

In the early days of our own republic political controversy revolved around the relation to England, with one faction being intensely provincial, and generally successful, and the other faction rather inclined to take the European view of our affairs. The situation in the republics that fringe the Gulf and Caribbean Sea to-day is identical, only the factions revolve around the issue of American interference.

Our smaller Southern neighbors have grown to look upon American interference as inevitable, with the faction that can enlist our sympathy pretty well assured of success. Hence the revolutionary factions struggle for the strategic position involved in the approval of our State Department. Sooner or later such approval means United States Marines to help the favored side.

This strikingly was illustrated in the June and July Presidential elections in the Republic of Panama in 1912. Dr. Belisario Porras, the popular candidate, openly solicited American military intervention, and
it was forthcoming. In Nicaragua, in August of 1912, Marines were landed ostensibly to protect American interests, but one faction had allied itself with those interests, so that our interference was in reality to aid that faction of revolutionists.

These incidents are not cited as instances of unwarranted interpretation of the Monroe doctrine. Each was justified by the facts of the individual case. The point in mind is that we are embarked upon a rôle, as umpire in Central and South American affairs, that will require the utmost keenness of Puritanic justice to prevent a change from a policy of altruism to one of open selfishness.

When President Roosevelt announced that if we ever went into Cuba again it would be to stay, he made just such a change imminent. There never was a declaration of policy that more widely missed the true spirit of the Monroe doctrine. It would start the United States upon a course that, in twenty-five years, would reduce every Gulf and Caribbean republic to the position of a satrapy of the United States, with United States soldiers, as in the Philippines, exercising the final powers of the legislative, executive, and judicial functions.

The lesson President Roosevelt had in mind was that the United States could not be continually troubling itself to maintain order among any people that were not capable of self-government. But, with the memory of other great nations, which undertook to manage the affairs of widely distributed peoples by the power of military might, not to mention the fundamental
tenets of our governmental faith on such an imperial policy, it will be wise for the Americans to be cautious in endorsing the Cuban declaration.

Our Civil War ought to have taught us that the American people cannot live in the face of a flagrant lie to our institutions. Slavery was such a lie, and it was stamped out. The military control we exercise over the Philippines is another such lie, but so far away and vague that the Puritan conscience does not grasp its significance. The moment we begin the forcible military occupation of Cuba, Mexico, or other American republics, we will be adding other lies to the foundation of our republic, namely, "that all men are free and equal and have certain inalienable rights."

The right of Cuba to manage its own affairs, however wretchedly, is an inalienable right. Our interference is never justified except to enable the Cubans to continue that right. Where we interfere to permanently remove that right, such as would occur in annexation or habitual military supervision, we pass the lie direct upon our own profession of principles.

God made the Americans a superior people to fulfill a high destiny, but he never made them so superior that they can trample all rights of weaker nations in the dust from a supercilious idea that we can manage their affairs better than they.

When President Roosevelt asks, Shall we forgive Cuba unto three times for its shortcomings? the answer of the American people must be, Yea, until seventy-times seven. But this does not mean that the United States must continue to bear the expense of
such efforts to prevent a collapse in Southern governments. Our interference primarily is to obviate the necessity of European interference, and if we act as police of the Western Hemisphere there should be a compensation, at least, equal to our outlay in such efforts.

Whenever we go into Cuba, Nicaragua, Panama, or any other republic, to protect American and European interests, the cost of the expedition should be assessed against the country which necessitated the expedition. Then we should retire and allow them to try again at the task of self-government. And we should stay off from annexation, or permanent military occupation, as we would from taking a tarantula into our national breast.

There is no truth quite so important for the American people to burn into their consciousness, as with a hot iron, to guide their foreign policy as this: The Lord we serve is no less the God of the Mongolian, the Ethiopian, or the Latin American than he is of the Caucasian and the American. Let us beware what we do against these other peoples in His name.

The wise decision of President Taft to stay out, both of Cuba and Mexico, during recent troubles, was in accordance with the best spirit of the Monroe doctrine. It allows these nations latitude to work out their own destinies, certainly the very least that they could ask. Meanwhile they are responsible for every dollar's damage they do to our own or foreign property, and any attempt to make them pay such damage would be founded in right. Forcible interference,
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however, automatically cancels a claim for damages, except such as may be won by the sword. And that would mean that our young manhood henceforth would have to be enlisted to sacrifice their lives in maintaining a suzerainty radically antagonistic to true Americanism.

Aside from the turbulent characteristic of the Latin American temperament, the most prolific cause of American interference in Central and South American affairs is the American capitalist. This especially is true in Cuba and Mexico, and in the republics south of Mexico to Panama.

Your American capitalist in these countries smiles indulgently when you talk about the departure of the United States from its principles in establishing sovereignty over the smaller republics. To him there is absolutely nothing on the horizon but the dollar he has invested, and his government does not exist except to guard that dollar. But he goes much further than that. He believes his dollar will have added value if the United States were sovereign instead of the particular native government under which he operates.

The sugar-plantation owners in Cuba are more responsible for the unsettled conditions in that island than the Cubans themselves. And they almost invariably are Americans. They believe that the free trade that would follow American occupation would benefit them as well as other phases of American governmental methods. Hence they finance revolu-
tions and assiduously work to create public opinion favorable to American sovereignty.

Native political factions, in their extremity, make alliances with the American interests of one kind or another, and so complicate the situation that it appears to be the usual case of a revolution. But the American dollar, even if not the primary cause, always is a potent secondary cause, and for that reason the United States should look a long time before it leaps at annexation or military suzerainty.

So far as the Latin republics are concerned, what difference would it make to them whether a European, or the American power, dispossesses them of self-government? If the Monroe doctrine does not stand as a bulwark against American domination, as well as against European domination, what boots it to them? Would American domination be wiser or less distasteful to a proud people than European domination? To what effect was all the revolting from Spain in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries if it is to be succeeded in the twentieth century by American sovereignty? And would not the American sword in Cuba be just as relentless in its autocratic sway as the Spanish sword?

We cannot afford to embark on a policy of paternalism in Latin America because of the damage it would do to us through underliving our basic ideals. This generation of Americans has before it the necessity of demonstrating that self-government is possible among our neighbors to the South. If we do not prove this truth, we may build a material civilization
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as high as the combined achievements of Egypt, Babylon, Greece, and Rome, and still the eternal query will arise, What shall it profit a nation if it gain the whole world and lose its own soul?

The Magdalena Bay incident is typical of the operations of capital in Latin America. Instead of jingoing about Japan over this Bay, why not find out what syndicate of capitalists is trying to force the United States to buy it, by spreading all kinds of rumors against a friendly power? There is no nation directing its foreign policy so wisely to-day as Japan, and it would as soon think of securing a naval base in the Americas as it would of attempting to annex China.

The Senate issued a warning to the world, reaffirming the Monroe doctrine as regards the securing of naval stations in the Western Hemisphere. Europe will respect the Monroe doctrine as long as the United States does. It will respect it as long as the United States maintains it as a disinterested, unselfish pronunciamento. But the moment we begin gobbling up these weak republics, that moment will Europe pounce down upon Central and South America. And then we will need the biggest navy our forests and mines can supply to maintain the Monroe doctrine.

There is more than one South American republic where Germany is regarded in a more friendly light than the United States. Germany has aided Brazil and Argentine to discipline their armies along modern lines, and these republics do not have to grovel at Uncle Sam's feet. Argentine is completing one of the largest battleships in the world. The European policy
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will be to encourage these Latin republics on the assumption that some day they may combine to humble the United States. Napoleon sold the United States the Louisiana purchase and remarked that he thereby sold a territory that would one day humble England.

The most salutary thing that could happen in the American foreign policy would be the apprehension and execution of any American capitalists who inspire revolutions in Latin America, rather than the hounding of these republics, more sinned against than sinning. From now on it is going to be a titanic struggle with the American people to prevent the ascendency of the dollar over principle in the interpretation of the Monroe doctrine. There is not the slightest doubt about our getting all that rightfully belongs to us. Can we restrain ourselves from taking more than our just desserts?

The Panama Canal makes us rub elbows with Latin America as never before. Secretary Knox, in his 1912 junket to Central America, assured the Latin republics that the United States does not crave one foot of their territory. Such a declaration will serve to keep the Monroe doctrine inviolate better than the largest caliber rifles, because it notified the world that we will not ourselves do what they have been forbidden to do. There is no nation in the world that will dare fight the United States when the right is on our side. We can keep it there only by loving our South American neighbors as we love ourselves.