It was realised by judicious observers at the outset of the Isthmian canal enterprise that the work of sanitation was of supreme importance, and especially the elimination of yellow fever, which, if not the most destructive of diseases there, was decidedly the most terrifying and demoralising. Nearly a century before, Humboldt had written that yellow fever and other diseases at Panama were due to the marine plants, mollusks, etc., on the beach at low tide, exposed to the heat of the sun, while on the Caribbean coast, at Porto Bello and elsewhere, bilious fever was due to putrescent emanations from rank vegetation. The world knows better than that now, having learned of the bacterial nature of those diseases and of the part played by certain varieties of mosquitoes in propagating them—the Stegomyia yellow fever and the Anopheles malaria. The attention of sanitarians at Panama was, therefore, given largely to the destruction of those insects, and to the guarding of non-immune people against their bites. In his address to the members of the Canal Commission, on their entrance upon their duties in the spring of 1904, President Roosevelt said:

“There is one matter to which I wish to ask your special attention—the question of sanitation and hygiene. You will take measures to secure the best medical experts for this purpose whom you can obtain, and you will, of course, make the contractors submit as implicitly as your own employees to all the rules and regulations of the medical department under you.”

It was remembered that epidemic diseases had been among the most formidable of the difficulties which the French
companies had encountered on the Isthmus, though there was encouragement in the fact that conditions had generally improved since the beginning of De Lesseps's enterprise. To that effect some statistics may be cited from Dr. Lacroisade, who was for many years director of the great French hospital at Ancon Hill, Panama. From 1881 to 1888 under the original company the number of employees averaged 10,854, and the mean yearly percentage of disease was 62.58, and of mortality 5.97 (though for a time there was the appalling death rate of 60 per cent. a year). From 1889 to 1894, under the receivership, the average number of men was only 971 and the percentage of disease was 49.68, and of mortality 2.88. Under the new French company, from 1895 to 1901 the number of men averaged 2,703, and the percentage of disease was 37.17, and of mortality 2.61. Moreover, of this last mortality percentage, 2.61, European diseases amounted to 2.10, and characteristic tropical diseases to only 0.51. From 1892 to 1897 there was no yellow fever on the Isthmus. With these figures before them, it behooved the American administrators to improve, if possible, upon the record.

As early as January 7, 1904, Mr. Buchanan, the American Minister to Panama, conferred with Rear-Admiral Glass, in command of the United States ships at Panama, concerning measures to prevent the importation of disease from Ecuadorian or other South American ports, and two days later he wrote to Señor Espriella, the Panaman Minister for Foreign Affairs, congratulating him upon the fact that there then existed upon the Isthmus no case of yellow fever, smallpox, or bubonic plague, and suggesting an active and intimate coöperation of Panaman and American authorities for the preservation of that immunity. To this Señor Espriella responded cordially, and the practical work of hospital reorganisation and quarantine improvement was promptly begun. The Provisional Board of Government of Panama on January 21 issued a decree imposing severe penalties upon all physicians and pharmacists who should fail at once to report to the National Board of Hygiene any cases of con-
tagious diseases coming under their notice. Nevertheless, a few cases of yellow fever presently appeared. Two deaths from that disease occurred in the hospital of San Tomas, Panama, on January 15, and other cases occurred at intervals during the year. On July 1, 1904, the American sanitary officers assumed charge of the Canal Zone, and from that date to December 20 following there were ten cases of yellow fever, of which two resulted fatally. Four of these cases occurred in the first two weeks of December, and two of them were known to Secretary Taft and his party on their visit to Panama at that time. Secretary Taft was, indeed, greeted on his arrival with the fearsome whisper that a case or two had just occurred. No public proclamation was made of the fact, for fear of creating a panic, but the fact was perfectly well known to the visitors, and was variously regarded. Some were frightened, while others pooh-poohed and scorned the idea that yellow fever could make any serious headway under American administration. But it did make headway. Week by week new cases occurred, steadily increasing in numbers. The rainy season came on, making almost every square foot of the wretched cobblestone pavements a breeding ground for the *Stegomyia*. To make the situation worse, many of the streets were torn up for the laying of sewers and water-mains, and, under the torrential tropic rains, were transformed into sluggish rivers of mud. Meantime demoralisation grew apace in the minds of the American colony. Among many fear and fright developed into absolute panic. As for those who had formerly scoffed, they assumed a cynical bravado and fatalism. The refrain of their daily song was the old

"One cup for the dead already,  
And hurrah for the next that dies!"

They professed contempt for the mosquito theory, and ostentatiously tore holes in the nettings which had been placed over the windows of the canal building, or removed them altogether, and disregarded all the sanitary precau-
tions and regulations which had been prescribed by the health officers.

It would be ungracious to dwell in too great detail or with too much emphasis upon responsibility for this state of affairs. Careful investigation and conservative consideration warrant, however, the charging of it chiefly to two causes. One was, the failure of the Canal Commission to support the efforts of the sanitary officers with the promptness and liberality which were required if those efforts were to be in the highest degree successful. There was too much "red tape." Those sanitary officers were in the positions of army officers on the firing line. It was necessary that they should have all the arms and munitions of sanitary warfare that they wanted, and should have them right away. The enforced waiting for weeks or months sometimes meant disaster. It is not for a moment to be supposed the Canal Commissioners were careless in the matter. They were as desirous as anybody that the fever should be suppressed and the sanitary conditions of the Isthmus should be improved. But at Washington they did not and could not realise the urgency of the case as fully as did the men at Colon and Panama. Moreover, they were under the restraint of caution lest they should be charged with looseness of business methods and with opening the door to "graft." In former years the name of Panama had been synonymous with scandal and corruption. These men proposed to avoid a repetition of that state of affairs, and if in doing so they erred, they erred on the side of caution.

The other cause of trouble was, the haste of the American nation to have the canal built. Because of that heedless haste, the cart was put before the horse. The canal work was begun before essential preparations for it were complete. This should have been realised at the outset. In its original bargain with the new-born Republic of Panama for the construction of the canal, the United States Government contracted to do a vast work of sanitation in the cities of Panama and Colon and in the whole stretch of country between
them. It undertook to create in them a sewer system, a water supply system, and civilised street pavements, and to do its utmost to destroy the *Anopheles* and *Stegomyia* mosquitoes, so as to banish malarial and yellow fevers. It was not through pure benevolence to Panama that the United States undertook such tasks, but in order to facilitate and expedite the construction of the canal; for it was seen that, if the canal was to be built, the Isthmus must be rendered fit for the builders to live in. There were those then who thought this preparatory work of sanitation should be done first, and that nobody should be set to work on the canal until yellow fever had been completely stamped out, as it had been years before in Cuba—under the direction of the same health officer, Colonel Gorgas, who is now in charge at Panama. But the popular impatience for the canal, and the President’s desire “to make the dirt fly,” were too strong to be at once resisted. The work of sanitation was begun, but without waiting for it to be completed several thousand men were also set at work upon the canal. The result was not exactly disastrous, but it was deplorable and demoralising.

The state of affairs in May, 1905, when Governor Magoon arrived upon the scene, may be summed up in three words—panic, lethargy, bravado; and the three together meant demoralisation. In that month there were thirty-eight cases of fever on the Isthmus, with a threat of a large increase in June. Governor Magoon arrived on May 25, and it did not take him long to perceive two things. One was that the first supreme and necessitous duty of the administration was to get rid of yellow fever, whether a single spadeful of earth was dug on the canal or not. The other was that the first step toward getting rid of the fever must be to restore the public mind—that of the non-immune Americans, especially—to sanity. He began by frankly and publicly declaring that he, personally, was afraid of the fever, and that in his opinion all non-immunes who professed not to be afraid were “talking rot!” Then he ordered all the window screens to
CHARLES E. MAGOON,
Governor of the Canal Zone and American Minister to Panama in 1905–6.
be repaired and replaced and kept in place, and announced that if any man was caught leaving them open or tearing holes in them, something uncommonly unpleasant would happen to him. Now, when a man of Judge Magoon's mental and physical stature admits that he is afraid, any lesser man is a fool to say he isn't; and when a man of Judge Magoon's resolution gives an order and prescribes a penalty for its violation, that order is very likely to be obeyed. In this case it was, and there was an end to the cheap bravado that had proved so costly.

The next step, promptly taken, was destruction of all mosquitoes possible by fumigation. They began with the canal building in Panama. It was thoroughly fumigated on the first Sunday after the Governor's arrival, and every second Sunday thereafter for some months, when the interval was increased to three weeks. But that was not enough. There were probably many infected mosquitoes in other buildings throughout the city, which must be destroyed. In Havana, Colonel Gorgas had followed the rule of disinfecting three houses for every case of fever: to wit, the house in which it had occurred and the house on each side of it. That practice was effective there. But Havana is a thousand miles further north than Panama, and has a winter climate which is fatal to the delicate Stegomyia. No such aid from nature was possible on the Isthmus, wherefore artifice must be more energetic. The heroic plan was, therefore, conceived of fumigating and disinfecting every building in the city of Panama! It was at first hoped to do this enormous work within twelve days, the period of yellow fever's incubation in the Stegomyia, but this was found to be impossible, and the time actually required was more than thirty days; but it seems probable that the work was just as effective as though it had been accomplished in the shorter time. As an illustration of the energy and expedition with which Isthmian affairs were then administered, it may be recalled that Governor Magoon had to send to Washington for material and appliances for the work. He did so by tele-
graph, and within forty-eight hours after the filing of his despatch the supplies were shipped and on their way to Panama. There was a time when it would have taken nearer forty-eight days.

It was evident to Governor Magoon, also, that the efforts of the Health Department had been for some reason not as effective as they should have been under so admirable a staff as that of Colonel Gorgas and with so excellent a hospital equipment, and he set about discovering where the fault lay. It was found in the system of reporting cases of fever. In a majority of cases the patients were ill four or five days before they were taken to the hospital or isolated and screened. Now, the first three or four days of the fever are the very time in which mosquitoes are most surely infected through biting the patient. Immediate isolation is, therefore, of the utmost importance. But here these patients had been left exposed to the bites of mosquitoes during that critical period, the time of all times when they should have been under screens. What was the cause of such laxity? It appeared that the health officers had not sufficient means at their disposal to employ expert inspectors, and were, therefore, compelled to depend for information upon voluntary reports of patients or their families, and upon reports from ordinary inexpert workmen who were engaged in cleansing water tanks and similar work. No wonder, under these conditions, that the fever was constantly spreading. Governor Magoon changed all that in a twinkling. He employed eight native Panaman physicians as sanitary inspectors, selecting, with the valuable aid of President Amador, who is a distinguished authority on yellow fever and other tropical diseases, those who were most familiar with yellow fever and who would be most likely to recognise it in its earliest stages. Then he divided the whole city of Panama into eight districts, and assigned one of these physicians to each district, with orders to make a thorough inspection of every house in it every day. That was thorough inspection with a vengeance! In addition, these physicians were directed to
act as missionaries and teachers, explaining to the people the mosquito theory, and impressing upon them the importance of hearty and constant coöperation with the American authorities in sanitation. The employment of native Panaman physicians for this purpose was a tactful device and obviated friction and opposition on the part of the people.

Colonel Gorgas also organised a practical school of sanitation for the employees of his department, both inspectors and workmen, to teach them what was to be done and why it must be done, and to enable them in turn to explain matters to the people. Then the whole city was thoroughly gone over, with a view to destroying all Stegomyia larvae which might be found in water tanks or other vessels, and either abolishing the receptacles or screening them so thoroughly that no more mosquitoes could get access to them. The Panamans are generally immune against yellow fever, and many of them had no faith in, if even knowledge of, the mosquito theory; and so they were disinclined to take the trouble to screen the tanks and to replace the screens carefully every time they were removed to get at the water. Tact and patience, however, in time overcame this difficulty and secured the hearty and efficient coöperation of the people of Panama. This achievement was, of course, greatly promoted by the introduction of a new water supply and the consequent abolition of the old tanks and cisterns. Governor Magoon at an early date withdrew the workmen from the canal and concentrated all efforts upon the waterworks and sewers, with happy results. By July 4, the principal water main was extended as far as the Cathedral Plaza, in the very heart of the city, and on that day the water was turned on for public use. It was supplied freely from street hydrants until plumbing connections were made with the houses. In addition, as a temporary measure, until the mains could be extended to all parts of the city, ten large "water wagons" were employed to go about the city, distributing water freely to all who could not get it from the hydrants. With such facilities afforded to the people, it was possible to proceed
vigorously with the work of destroying water barrels and tanks and filling up wells and underground cisterns. Before the end of the year fully nineteen-twentieths of such water receptacles which had existed in Panama had been destroyed. Meantime, a careful watch was kept on all the streets of the city for the immediate removal and destruction of all empty cans, bottles, etc., which, holding a little water, might serve as mosquito nests, and the filling up, drainage, or treating with oil or disinfectants of all pools and puddles of water. In this way it was made practically impossible for the Stegomyia to be propagated in Panama. A similar work was performed in Colon and in the various villages along the line of the railroad and canal.

Statistics show the results of this policy. I have said that in May, 1905, there were thirty-eight cases and more were expected in June. They came, of course, because the results of former neglect were then to be reaped, and there was not time for the results of the new policy, which dates from Governor Magoon’s arrival on May 25, to appear. In June there were sixty-two cases and Governor Magoon, without losing faith in the ultimate triumph of his and Colonel Gorgas’s policy, seriously considered the question of temporarily removing the entire non-immune population of Panama from the city, and placing it upon the beautiful and salubrious island of Taboga, in the bay. It is probable that the whole clerical force of the canal administration, at least, would thus have been transferred had the buildings on Taboga been in proper condition to receive it. As it was, this step was not taken and was soon seen not to be needed. In July the number of cases decreased to forty-two, and a general feeling of encouragement arose. In August the number fell to twenty-seven and victory was within sight. In September the disease came to an end, with a total of only six cases. The last case in Colon occurred on August 27, and the last case in the city of Panama on September 14. The last case anywhere in the Canal Zone occurred at the village of Matachin, on September 29, where I think the
fever had never been known before. The case was obviously an adventitious one, imported by some remote chance, but to guard against even the slightest danger of its duplication, the whole village was literally saturated with disinfectants, so that a *Stegomyia* flying over it would probably have dropped dead.

Thus "Finis" was written to the story of yellow fever in Panama. For some weeks Colonel Gorgas with Governor Magoon’s sanction publicly and conspicuously advertised a reward of $50 in gold to any one not connected with the Health Department who should report a case of the fever in the Canal Zone or in the cities of Panama and Colon, but nobody claimed the reward. The offer, was not, of course, made in any spirit of bravado or vainglory. It was intended to serve two exceedingly important and practical purposes. One was to reassure the minds of all non-immunes and put a final quietus upon the demoralisation which had recently existed. The other was to inspire the utmost vigilance among all people, to transform every member of the population into an amateur sanitary detective, and thus to secure for the health officers the earliest possible information of any suspicious case of illness; for now that yellow fever is actually suppressed every sanitarian will appreciate the supreme necessity of guarding against the spread of infection from any solitary sporadic case which may occur.

The completeness of the triumph of sanitation may be estimated from the fact that in August, 1905, the month in which yellow fever was practically subdued, the death rate in the Canal Zone was only 25 to the thousand yearly, which is little more than that of many of our northern cities, and vastly less than that of many tropical and semi-tropical communities. The death rate of Alexandria, Egypt, is about 35, that of Cairo is nearly 38, that of Calcutta is 30, that of Madras is 38, and that of Bombay is 55. Panama is a sanitarium compared with those places. In 1904 the death rate of Dublin and its suburbs was 23.3, of Breslau 23.5, of Moscow 27.6, of Rio de Janeiro 22, of St. Petersburg 23.7, of
Trieste 25.8, of Venice 22.2, of Liverpool 22.6, of New Orleans 21.5, and of New York 22.6. Compared with these the rate of 25 at Panama is highly creditable. In that same month of August, 1905, out of 12,000 workmen in the Canal Zone, only 301 entered the hospitals. That fact compares well with conditions in almost any industrial community.

Nor is the work of sanitation by any means complete, nor is the death rate reduced as low as we may hope it will soon be. Down to the beginning of 1906 there had been, in the Canal Zone, less than an acre of swamp actually filled in, and about 145 acres drained; three and a half miles of new ditches dug, and less than 30 miles of old ditches cleaned and paved; and about 412 acres of grass and jungle cut and burned. These achievements were only a scratching of the surface, only a beginning of the work which is to redeem Panama from pestilence and make it as healthful as it is beautiful.

Much was promptly done by the reorganised Commission in 1905 for the general welfare of the staff, employees, and residents of the Canal Zone, apart from, and in addition to, the works of sanitation. Reading rooms, club rooms, gymnasiums, and other places of social entertainment and recreation were provided. They had been much needed, for the Zone was formerly quite destitute of such things. Still more important was the supplying of food. Governor Magoon, upon his arrival at the Isthmus, quickly perceived that this was a matter of supreme and vital interest, and he quickly set about the task of dealing with it. There was no hope of getting satisfactory supplies, at reasonable prices, on the Isthmus. Owing to the fact that the natives never look beyond their present necessities, no surplus food supply ever accumulates. This normal condition of no surplus was greatly intensified by the almost total failure of the crops for the two preceding years, by the abandonment by agricultural labourers of their farms back in the hills for work on the canal, where they received higher pay for shorter hours, and by quarantine against the port of Panama on account
of bubonic plague, which prevented the arrival of foodstuff from neighbouring provinces. The Commission was thus brought face to face with the problem of feeding 17,000 men with the base of supplies 2,000 miles away.

Governor Magoon soon arranged to open local commissary stores at every important labour camp, to provide mess houses, and to furnish food, both cooked and uncooked, to all employees at cost. Orders were sent by cable to have the Commission's steamers equipped with refrigerating plants, arrangements were made for the erection of a temporary cold storage plant at Colon, and refrigerator cars were purchased for immediate shipment to the Isthmus, thus establishing a line of refrigeration from the markets of the United States to the commissary stations of the Isthmus. The equipment in existing hotels was also purchased from individuals lessees and their management assumed by the Commission. The net result of these efforts is that to-day all employees have an opportunity to obtain an abundant supply of wholesome food, cooked and uncooked, at reasonable prices. The silver men—that is, the common labourers—that is, those of the higher class—at 90 cents per day, and they get good food in place of bad.

I have related the story of the commissaries thus briefly, chiefly in the words of the Commission's own report. It should be added that the people of Panama at first strongly protested against the arrangement, fearing it would deprive them of a profitable market for their wares; but Governor Magoon diplomatically argued the point with them and reconciled them to the new order of things, on the ground that it would be better for them to have the canal constructed promptly than to have it delayed in order to retain a market for their produce at exorbitant prices. Mr. Shouts then made a contract with a leading railroad and hotel caterer of the United States to undertake the work of feeding all the employees in the Zone; but before anything material was done to execute it the contract was cancelled and the com-
missary department remained under the direct charge of the Commission.

A victory was won for morals and thrift in the Canal Zone, in September, 1905, when the first decision of the Supreme Court of the Zone was rendered. The purport of that decision was to confirm the validity of Act No. 4 of the Canal Zone laws, under which the conducting of a public gambling place is made a penal offence. A man was charged with running a roulette table. He did not deny the fact, but claimed a right to maintain the place under a concession from the Republic of Panama. The Circuit Court overruled his plea and found him guilty, sentencing him to a fine of $100 and thirty days' imprisonment. He made appeal to the Supreme Court, which unanimously affirmed the decree of the lower court, with a modification of the sentence. It was held by this decision that under the treaty between the United States and the Republic of Panama, the United States has full control of the Canal Zone, just as though it were the actual sovereign of that territory, free from all anterior obligations or concessions of any kind, and has also full power to legislate for the Zone. If any concession holder is aggrieved by such exercise of authority by the United States, his remedy is in action against the Republic of Panama, and not against the United States. The prohibition of gambling within the Zone was within the legal power of the Isthmian Canal Commission, under the treaty and under the act of Congress constituting the Commission, and is therefore valid. The effect of this decision was most salutary. Gambling had long been one of the chief vices of Panama. It was one of the worst features of the régime of the French canal companies. The purveyor of lottery tickets and the tout for gambling dens dogged the heels of the pay-master, and a large share of the wages paid went quickly into the pockets of professional gamblers. It is now determined that there shall be no more gambling within the limits of the Canal Zone, and that means that there will be none within reach of the vast majority of the canal employees.
This is a gratifying assurance for morals, for industry, and for thrift, and it will serve as another of those valuable object lessons which Americans are giving to the Panamans, and which the latter, it is encouraging to observe, appreciate and use to their own profit.

Early in 1906 two more decisions were made with a view to facilitating and expediting the work of canal construction. One was made on January 8, by the President, the Secretary of War, the Chairman of the Canal Commission, the Chief Engineer, and the United States Civil Service Commission, to the effect that the civil service rules and regulations, devised for use in the United States, should not apply in Panama, in the employment of what were termed in a general way "outside men,"—that is, track layers, skilled labourers, foremen, etc. To other classes of employees, stenographers, clerks, bookkeepers, and other "inside men," the rules were to continue to apply. The other decision was made by Congress, a month later; to the effect that the eight-hour labour law should no longer be enforced upon the Isthmus. It was recognised that that law, devised for the benefit of American labourers in America, was not suited to the conditions at Panama, where the labourers were nearly all aliens, who had never even heard of the eight-hour law before and who had no desire for its application. The enforcement of that law would, therefore, benefit nobody and please nobody, but would greatly delay the completion of the canal and increase its cost.
CHAPTER XIX

STULTILOQUENTIA

The progeny of Gifted Hopkins is numerous and vociferous. There is no important subject upon which much nonsense is not spoken, and there is no great work concerning which there are not counsels of folly. In most cases we may perhaps concede these to have been the output of honest ignorance, or of that intrepidity and precipitancy of judgment to which the human mind is too often prone. When the Quarterly Review declared a man might as well ride upon a Congreve rocket as upon a railroad train at twenty miles an hour, it was doubtless sincere, and not moved by malice against Stephenson. We may say the same of Thiers, with his cocksure pronouncement that, however useful railroads might be for some purposes, they could never be of value for transporting freight. Lardner was doubtless animated by a purely scientific spirit when he argued that no steamship could carry enough coal to feed its engines on a voyage across the Atlantic. The railings against the Erie Canal were perhaps less honest, having a strong tincture of partisan politics; and the British prophecies that the Suez Canal would never pay its cost were probably in part inspired by jealousy of the French builders of that great highway. In the case of Panama, there has been more folly emitted than in any of these others, and it has been of a distinctly lower type, marked chiefly either with deliberate malice or with a crass ineptitude most urgently requiring the fool-killer's attention. It would require a large volume to contain even a synopsis of the half-foolish and half-malicious stuff which has been spoken, written, and printed about various phases of the Panama enterprise in the last three years. The compass of this chapter would not
suffice for a mere catalogue of it. But it may serve the purpose to cite just a few samples of its chief types. *Ex pede—Thersitem!*

One of the first propagandists of folly, in point of time, was employed by a political organisation in the United States, to go into a foreign land and there lampoon and libel his own country and its government for the sake of hoped-for partisan advantages in a political campaign. He went to Colombia in December, 1903, right after the Panaman revolution, and sought to cultivate the acquaintance of the President, Dr. Marroquin. He represented himself as the agent of the newspaper press of one of the great political parties of this country, which was strongly opposed to President Roosevelt's administration and especially to his policy toward Colombia and Panama. He had come, he said, to investigate and to report upon the "situation of Colombia with regard to the painful occurrences upon the Isthmus of Panama." "There prevails in my country, with respect to this matter," he said, "a great sentiment of sympathy for Colombia; and the acts and attitude of the Roosevelt government are regarded with profound repugnance." He, therefore, sought "such information and opinions as shall enable the American people to make a decision in favour of your excellency's government and the people of Colombia." That is to say, he was confessedly seeking, in a foreign land, mud to throw at his own government! The political ethics of Colombia have not always been of the highest type, but they were far too high for such a scheme as that, and Dr. Marroquin pretty promptly and curtly declined to lend himself to the tainted scheme. He answered the applicant with a few words which produced "the most painful impression." Thereupon this precious propagandist betook himself to Panama, as the accredited agent of a political organisation, and there, in September and October, 1904, during the Presidential campaign in the United States, busied himself with trying to prove that Dr. Marroquin—who by this time was dead and unable to defend
himself against such attacks—had been a perjured and sor-
did knave, who had conspired with President Roosevelt to
betray Colombia for American gold! The astounding fiction
was evolved that President Roosevelt, through Secretary
Hay, had bribed Dr. Marroquin, with $250,000, himself to
foment the Panaman revolution and so turn the Canal Zone
over to the United States. Cipher despatches were actually
sent by this accomplished discoverer of mare’s nests from
Panama to his political employers in the United States,
declaring that if he were supplied with sufficient funds he
could secure documentary proofs of such a bargain! Doubt-
less he could have done so. The supply of fiction is always
adequate to the demand, especially under the potent inspi-
ration of “Culebra cocktails.” I do not think the slightest
perceptible result was produced upon the United States
election by this fantastic folly, but I do know that the joy
of Panama was materially enhanced by it. For many a
week thereafter the very mention of that versatile propa-
gandist’s name, whether in a club on the Cathedral Plaza or
in the less conventional purlieus of the road to “Section,”
was an unfailing and irresistible provocation to something
more than Homeric mirth.

Another outbreak occurred a year later. At the beginning
of September, 1905, the corner stone of a new school building
was laid at La Trinchera, in the presence of the President of
Panama and his Cabinet, and an oration was pronounced by
a prominent young member of the Opposition party. Im-
m ediately it was announced, and bruited over the world, that
the speaker had bitterly referred to the impending spolia-
tion of Panama by the United States, and impassioned homi-
lies were published upon the wickedness of America’s thus
oppressing the little republic, and we were warned—all this
stuff in our own American press, of course—that when the
Liberals came into power in Panama there would be resist-
ance to the bitter end against our confiscatory schemes. It
is quite true that he did speak of the Republic of Panama as
being about to be “rent in twain by the iron hand of Amer-
ica,” but there was scarcely a person in the audience who did not understand what was, of course, his meaning—that America was going to cut a big ditch across the Isthmus! He, in fact, welcomed that prospect, as assuring the future greatness of Panama.

I remember, too, another case, in which a probably well-meaning descendant of the illustrious Hopkins, in an important magazine article, dolefully descanted upon the primitive and barbarous conditions which prevailed along the line of the canal. When this pious pilgrim visited the labourers' camp at Culebra, he found there actually no pavements on the sidewalks. Neither were there electric lights. He could find no resorts of entertainment and social culture, excepting a reading room and a café, the latter, by the way, deserted! Beside all of which, it rained! Men familiar with similar camps in the United States will appreciate the unrelieved horror of the situation, and will join with that scribe in condemning the American Government for trying to dig a canal without first establishing squash courts and automobile garages all along the line, and changing the climate so that it could be depended upon not to rain when distinguished visitors were in town.

At the risk of tediousness, I must quote somewhat at length a really notable gem of anti-Panaman literature, which has recently been widely current. Here it is:

“A land as feverish to the imagination as to the body is Panama. It is a land making a fitting environment to the deeds of conspiracy, piracy, loot, cruelty, and blood that have principally made its history for centuries. This gloomy, God-forsaken Isthmus is a nightmare region. One descriptive writer has truly said of it that it is a land where the flowers have no odour, the birds no song; where the men are without honour, and the women without virtue. He is not far wrong. The birds, brilliant as is their plumage, have no musical notes. The dense forests teem with bright-hued parrots, parroquets, and other birds, which squeak and scream but do not sing. There are beautiful orchids to be found in the swamps and jungles, fair to look upon, but they have no odour. The oranges have green skins, instead of
golden, the plantains must be fried to make them fit to eat, the reptiles and insects are often venomous, and myriads of parasites are ever ready to invade the human body and bring disease and death. In the atmosphere itself is something suggestive of the days of the old pirates and their fiendish cruelties and orgies. There is no life in the air; it is depressing, damp, miasmatic, and intensely hot. For a great part of the year thunder showers succeed each other all day long and half the night, with sheet lightning all around the horizon after dark. There is practically no twilight, day passing almost instantly into night. It is no wonder that this uncanny land has made its residents degenerate into plotters, revolutionists, murderers, and thieves. Its aspect is one of darkness, treachery, and curse.”

Now I wonder if the author of that precious twaddle really regards a land of exceptionally brilliant and profuse sunshine as “gloomy.” I wonder if he is really ignorant of the fact that it is the rule in all tropical lands, and indeed to a considerable extent in all the world, that the most brilliantly coloured birds are songless and the singers are of plain and inconspicuous dress; and that the gaudiest flowers are destitute of sweet perfume. Did he never compare a blue-jay with a cat-bird, or a wood-duck with a nightingale? Did he never observe the differences between a peony and a violet? It is quite true that at Panama the oranges have green skins. So they do everywhere, before they are ripe! It is true that plantains are better fried than raw, as they are in Jamaica, and New York, and everywhere; though they are better raw in Panama than in almost any other part of the world, and are eaten raw there as often as anywhere else. Of course, there is little twilight; but does anybody suppose that is a condition peculiar to Panama and unknown in other tropical lands? As for the monstrous fling at the people of Panama, it could not—save in an ignorance scarcely removed from criminality—have been made by any one capable of appreciating either the honour of men or the virtue of women. I should not have quoted the offensive stuff, save for the purpose which is sometimes served of putting a bit of carrion in the pillory.
One more example of *stultiloquentia* running amuck, and I leave this unpleasant phase of my subject. I refer to Mr. Poultney Bigelow's screed on "Our Mismanagement at Panama," in the New York *Independent*, of January 4, 1906, chiefly for two reasons. One is, that its writer's name is somewhat more conspicuous than the names of most of the other purveyors of misinformation and malice who have expended their ignorance or spleen upon Panama, and the other is, that it was deemed of sufficient interest to be the subject of Executive inquiry and Congressional investigation. But I am at a loss to know whether to regard it as the more malicious or absurd. Certainly nothing could be more preposterous than the pretensions to encyclopaedic wisdom which are put forth in the article, when contrasted with the meagreness of the writer's information and of his opportunity for acquiring information.

"I have had," says Mr. Bigelow, "abundant opportunity to hear the views of opposing witnesses, but I have also been in a position to examine on the spot many things which have so far been conspicuous by their absence in so-called 'official' and authoritative reports. . . . I made a house-to-house visitation throughout the best part of a blazing hot day. . . . One day I stopped to chat with a well-dressed, intelligent, and energetic negro. . . . Next day I came to the same place for another chat. He was not there. . . ."

The facts are that Mr. Bigelow reached Colon on the steamer *Trent*, at 10 a. m. on November 30, went across to Panama, returned to Colon the same evening, and sailed away at 2.10 p. m. on December 1. Thus he spent precisely twenty-eight hours and ten minutes on the Isthmus, half of that time being a holiday when no work was done. The "abundant opportunity" was all within that brief period. The "best part of a blazing hot day" was presumably the forenoon of December 1, just before he sailed. The "one day" and the "next day" were the only days he spent at Panama. Note, also, that his article, which was published in New York, on January 4, 1906, was dated, as a letter, at
"Panama, December, 1905," as though it had been written at Panama and sent on from that place where he was still remaining; when, as a matter of fact, it was not and could not have been written there, for it bears intrinsic and confessed evidence of having been written at least some days later, at some place remote from Panama.

The specific charges against the canal management which Mr. Bigelow made were specifically answered by Mr. Stevens, the Chief Engineer. Mr. Bigelow's information as to the awful unhealthfulness of Colon seems to have been derived largely from a man who had lived there for more than forty years and had all that time been in splendid health! The "vast hordes" of negroes whom Mr. Bigelow saw fleeing from the Isthmus had been employed there for the best part of a year, and were going home to spend the Christmas holidays. The quarter-mile awning which Mr. Bigelow saw stretched over a ditch, which he was told was "to protect the workmen from the sun," and which tale he believed because "no one could invent such midsummer madness," was really put there to protect the concrete lining of the drain from rain until it had hardened. Concerning the new hotel at Corozal, said Mr. Stevens, "Mr. Bigelow's statement that it is deserted is absolutely false. Every room is occupied, and has been since it was opened." The "big new dredges at the Culebra cut" were not dredges at all but steam shovels. "The statement that there is no water supply at Colon is absolutely and unqualifiedly false." In such manner, with citations of facts, figures, and indisputable evidence, Mr. Stevens traversed and refuted practically every serious accusation made by Mr. Bigelow. On some essential points further refutation was provided by Governor Magoon. In summing the matter up in an official report to the President, Secretary Taft said:

"I learn from the isthmus that the writer arrived in Panama on the Royal Mail steamer Trent from Jamaica, and left by the same steamer. The steamer docked at 10 o'clock on the morning of November 30, and sailed at 2 o'clock on the
afternoon of December 1. Assuming that after landing and docking the writer at once began work, it is not unfair to say that his opportunities for observation were limited to twenty-eight hours, including daytime and nighttime. It would seem not to be a very long period in which to look carefully into and determine the character of the engineering difficulties of the greatest constructive enterprise yet undertaken by man, the efficiency of tropical negro labour, the healthfulness of a city, the proper place to put dredges, the proper amount of capacity to obtain from steam shovels, the character of the administration of justice, the proper position of hotels along the line of the road, the question whether a sewer system should be adapted to Panama at all, or whether the sewer system as established was sufficient for the purpose. Nor does it seem to offer the abundant opportunity for examining opposing witnesses on controverted issues which the writer of the article assures us that he had. The 'many things on the spot' which he says he was able to examine must, therefore, be taken with some qualification. In view of the time which this critic—a man with no knowledge of engineering whatever—took to decide all the questions which arise in the construction of the canal and pronounce them of altogether vanishing difficulty, he should not take exception to the seven or eight days which twelve of the most distinguished engineers in the world in canal construction devoted to the same task. . . .

"The writer of the article says that he proposes to state the truth from the standpoint 'neither of an officeholder nor an office seeker, much less that of a disappointed contractor or an invalided labourer;' that 'he has had abundant opportunity to hear the views of opposing witnesses' and was in a position 'to examine on the spot many things so far conspicuous for their absence in so-called "official" and authoritative reports.' It will be observed that from the beginning to the end of the article the writer shows that instead of seeking evidence from the officials responsible for the work on the Isthmus he deliberately avoided consulting them or giving them any opportunity whatever to state their knowledge or explanation of the facts which he says had attracted his attention. When the actual facts are compared with the statements in this article it gives rise to doubt what the real explanation of the article is—whether it was written from such a wanton motive as actuates a pure sensation monger or whether it arises from the exaggerated eccentric-
ity of mind which furnishes both an excuse and an explanation."

If I have thus devoted more space to Mr. Bigelow's attack upon the canal administration than the importance of it may seem to some to warrant, it is because of all such attacks his was apparently the most studied and detailed, and of all who have made such attacks he was the best known and the most likely to command attention and credence. If, therefore, his attack was not important, it was at any rate the least unimportant of them all. In one respect it was highly important, and that was, as an exposure of the weakness of the enemy. It was with reason said on every hand that if that was the most destructive criticism that could be directed against the canal administration, then that administration must be pretty nearly sans peur et sans reproche, and the net result unquestionably was to discredit all other attacks upon the administration and to confirm it more strongly than ever before in public confidence.

Nevertheless, even though good be thus brought out of it, evil remains evil still; and it would be difficult to find a way of absolving Mr. Bigelow—or his article—from the imputation either of evil intent or of evil ignorance. If his misstatements were made knowingly, Mr. Stevens's characterisations of them, in stronger terms than any I have quoted, must be deemed well deserved. If they were made ignorantly, what is to be said of the ignorance that assumes omniscience? It is just possible, however, that there is a third explanation, besides the two suppositious ones already named, and that it is the true one, to wit, habit. Account must be taken of idiosyncrasies. Almost simultaneously with the publication of this diatribe in New York there appeared from Mr. Bigelow's pen in a leading London journal—The Outlook—an attack upon the American army administration which I can scarcely describe with a milder word than malignant. Taking for his text some statements of Secretary Taft—whom he repeatedly called "my illus-
trious friend”—in defence of the American army against some German criticisms, this American writer in a foreign journal assured his foreign readers that “during the Spanish war of 1898 the military authorities at Washington treated the army mainly as a means of political jobbery;” that “the commanders of brigades, divisions, and army corps were as a rule profoundly ignorant of elementary military matters;”—to wit, Generals Miles, Wheeler, Shafter, Lee, Chaffee, Lawton, Brooke, Merritt, Grant, Wilson, Stone, MacArthur, et al.; that “our generals are mainly conspicuous for not having been educated at West Point;” that “the American army is not fit to take the field to-day. The same spirit which made it the tool of political jobbers during the Spanish war is dominant to-day,” et cetera. If these strictures and railings had been true, the publication of them in an American paper might have been entirely justifiable, and commendable. But to select a foreign medium and a foreign constituency for the publication of such a belittlement of one’s own country, might well be regarded as indicating a mental habit as much at variance with patriotic manners and morals as that shown in the Panama article was at variance with truth.

It was in reviewing such utterances as those which I have cited in this chapter, of which the name, all through the year 1905, was legion, that President Roosevelt, on January 8, 1906, wrote in a message to Congress:

"From time to time various publications have been made, and from time to time in the future various similar publications, doubtless, will be made, purporting to give an account of jobbing or immorality or inefficiency or misery as obtaining on the Isthmus. I have carefully examined into each of these accusations which seemed worthy of attention. In every instance the accusations have proved to be without foundation in any shape or form. They spring from several sources. Sometimes they take the shape of statements by irresponsible investigators of a sensational habit of mind, incapable of observing or repeating with accuracy what they see, and desirous of obtaining notoriety, by wide-spread slan-
der. More often they originate with or are given currency by individuals with a personal grievance. The sensation mongers, both those who stay at home and those who visit the Isthmus, may ground their accusations on false statements by some engineer, who, having applied for service on the Commission and been refused such service, now endeavours to discredit his successful competitors, or by some lessee or owner of real estate who has sought action or inaction by the Commission to increase the value of his lots, and is bitter because the Commission cannot be used for such purposes, or on the tales of disappointed bidders for contracts, or of officeholders who have proved incompetent or who have been suspected of corruption and dismissed, or who have been overcome by panic and have fled from the Isthmus. Every specific charge relating to jobbery, to immorality, or to inefficiency, from whatever source it has come, has been immediately investigated and in no single instance have the statements of these sensation mongers and the interested complainants behind them proved true. The only discredit inhering in these false accusations is to those who originate and give them currency, and who, to the extent of their abilities, thereby hamper and obstruct the completion of the great work in which both the honour and the interest of America are so deeply involved. It matters not whether those guilty of these false accusations utter them in mere wanton recklessness and folly, or in a spirit of sinister malice to gratify some personal or political grudge."

To that, we may well add that it is high time we were at an end of this flood of folly and worse than folly, and were at least within measurable distance of an end of the discussions and investigations of Panaman affairs which have been so copious for most of the time since the great enterprise was undertaken. That view of the case was well expressed by Secretary Taft, in a public address at Detroit, Michigan, in February, 1906. He had been speaking of the then current investigation into canal affairs, and had made it clear that neither he nor the President nor anybody else in authority shrank from the most searching scrutiny of everything that had been done. But, he continued:

"After one thorough investigation has been completed and every truthful man and every liar has been heard, then let
the work go on. You can't be answering questions and building a canal at the same time. You can't have the chief engineer and the other constructing officers engaged in that work both in Washington and on the Isthmus. Therefore, I say that all those who wish to be heard ought to be heard now, or ever after hold their peace."

There spoke the voice of common sense and justice. Discussion and investigation have doubtless been necessary. But some day there should be an end of them, and that day should be somewhere this side of the Greek Kalends.
CHAPTER XX

THE NEXT THING

The task before us at Panama is well begun. Despite the proverb, however, it is not half done, and it will not be done years hence when the canal is opened to the commerce of the world. It is a never-ending task which we have undertaken, a perpetual responsibility which we have assumed. That is a fact which should be well borne in mind. "Do the next thing" is a wise counsel; and we may supplement it with many others to the same effect, from the divine "sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof," to the homely adjuration not to cross a bridge until we reach it. But there is an equal marshalling of authorities to the contrary effect, that it is not wise to begin building a house until the plans are drawn and the cost is counted. Assuredly it would not be wise to engage in a permanent undertaking upon a temporary basis. In every detail of our work at Panama, therefore, it is to be remembered that we are doing a work for all time; whether in engineering, or in sanitation, or in the establishment of political and social relationships with the Isthmian people.

That was one powerful argument in favour of a sea-level canal, as I have already tried to show. If we were constructing a canal for ten or twenty years, one at high level might be preferable, and would certainly be the less expensive. But we are making a canal for all time, to be in use as long as the trade winds sweep the Caribbean and the tides of the Pacific rise and fall. The plan of it should, therefore, be determined and adopted with such destiny in view. And there are still those who hold that, despite the contrary decision now made and the high-level plan now adopted, we
shall in time have to come to the sea-level plan. The ques-
tion is whether we shall secure for ourselves and for posteri-
ity the advantage and the reward of a wise forethought, or
shall incur the inexorable penalty of cowardice and delay.
Surely it would seem that the fulfilment of the world’s desire
of four centuries in the completion of an equatorial water-
way around the globe is an enterprise more worthily to be
achieved in a Promethean than in an Epimethean spirit.

The same is to be said of the adjunct and auxiliary works.
There are harbours to construct; perhaps, on the Caribbean,
a new terminal city to build; the appurtenances of civilisa-
tion to supply throughout the Canal Zone. These are not
simply to be done for the construction of the canal, during
the next five or ten or fifteen years, but for the perpetual
maintenance of the canal for uncounted centuries to come.
It was a heroic task to get rid of yellow fever in the summer
of 1905. But what is it going to be, to keep the Isthmus
free from that and other pestilences “far on, in summers
that we shall not see,” in 1955, and 2005? Is that looking
too far? We must respect the future, said Jacques Cartier.
There are those who would interpret that to mean that we
should not overtax ourselves with efforts and expenditures
for the remote future, but should leave a share of the burden
for the future itself to bear. That in a measure is true. But
a no less true interpretation is that we are not to impose
upon the future the handicap of our weakness and cowardice,
nor to compel it to undo the ill-devised deeds of our short-
sighted blundering. It might be well to leave the pecuniary
cost of the canal to be paid little by little through the next
century, or the next five centuries. It would not be well
to turn a single spadeful of soil or to lay a single stone for
some future generation to undo. “Sufficient unto the day
is the evil thereof,” and sufficient unto the future days will
be the tasks of that time, without a legacy of our ineptitude.

This principle applies with peculiar force to the question
of labour on the canal. There is a vast amount of work to
be done, and of manual work despite our utmost introduc-
tion of machinery. It is reckoned that as many as 25,000 workmen, efficient according to the American standard, will need to be employed, if the canal is to be constructed with all possible expedition. Now the efficiency of labour in the United States is about three times as great as that in Panama. To secure such a working energy, therefore, it will be necessary to employ something like 75,000 men. That will be a formidable army, equal in numbers to the entire adult male population of the republic. It will be no easy task to secure such hosts of workingmen, and from the political and social point of view it will be no light thing to introduce them into the Zone and into the Republic of Panama.

There arises at once the question whether they are to be introduced for the temporary purposes of canal construction, or as permanent residents of the Isthmus. Beyond doubt, I think, the latter would be preferable, provided they were of proper character. Panama needs more men. The population of the state is not more than a tithe of what it should be. Belgium, scarcely more than one-third as extensive in area, has twenty-two times as many people. Bulgaria, only a little larger than Panama, has ten times its population. Switzerland, only half as large as Panama, and with so much of its area uninhabitable, has ten times as many people as the Isthmian republic. Nor need we confine ourselves to comparisons with distant lands in another zone. The neighbouring Republic of Salvador has scarcely a quarter of Panama's area, yet has more than three times its population. Hayti has only a third of Panama's area, yet has four times its population. Nor is there any natural inhibition against the increase of population on the Isthmus. Climate and soil and products are all well calculated for the prosperous maintenance of ten times the present number of inhabitants. We need not here enter elaborately into the causes which have retarded growth. They have been sufficiently indicated in the story of Panama's misgovernment at the hands of Colombia, with all the attendant wars and revolutions, the neglect of sanitation and other public interests, and the general
prostitution of Isthmian interests and welfare to the passions and greed of Bogotá. With the new era that was established in 1903, a marked change in the Isthmian census should be effected.

It would be desirable, then, to increase the population of Panama by introducing an army of workmen for the canal who would remain as permanent residents after the completion of the canal. But in that case, as I have already hinted, they must be men of desirable character, from both the Panaman and the American point of view. They must be such as would be congenial and acceptable to the present people of Panama, and would be worthy citizens of that republic; and they must be also well disposed toward the United States and its administration of the Canal Zone and its protectorate of Panama. It would be criminal to introduce an element which would be antagonistic to the Panamans, and it would be one of those blunders which are worse than crimes to plant upon the Isthmus a numerous colony hostile to the United States. From what source, then, could we secure a permanent industrial army answering these requirements?

The answer, I fear, must be that there is no adequate source. Workmen can doubtless be secured, but not enough of them of a kind desirable for citizenship in Panama. For to be thus desirable, or even acceptable, they must be of the Caucasian race. This is to be said without the slightest prejudice against either the black or the yellow race, but with the fullest sympathy with them and the fullest appreciation of their excellent qualities. But even those who—like myself—most strongly condemn the savage proscription and persecution of Chinamen which was begun by the hoodlums and criminals of the Pacific Coast and which—through agencies too well understood to require elucidation—have now become potent throughout the land, even we, I say, would shrink from the prospect of introducing say ten million Chinese coolies into the United States. Well, proportionally, it would be as bad as that to introduce fifty thou-
sand of them into Panama. There are already, I think, more Chinese in Panama than in the United States, proportionally; and the Panaman government is certainly as much justified as our own in prohibiting their further immigration. Those who are already there are treated with a degree of courtesy and justice which makes the American observer blush at the contrast it presents to the savagery of New York, San Francisco, and Rock Springs. But to the increase of their number to an extent which would make them one-seventh the population of the whole republic, Panama not unreasonably nor unrighteously objects.

Neither would it be well to plant there so large a permanent colony of the negro race. In saying this there is no thought of prejudice against the negro. But it is not well to transform a white man's country into a black man's country; and especially it is not well to plant the seeds of racial antagonisms in a country where that noxious plant has hitherto been unknown. At the present time, the white race is the dominant race in Panama, though there is no discrimination whatever against the coloured race. A negro is as good as a Spaniard in Panama, provided his character and capacity are equal to the Spaniard's. Or if there is any disposition to treat the negro as an inferior, it has been introduced there by Americans. As to numbers, I believe the negroes equal and perhaps outnumber the whites, and might be able to outvote them and control the government if they were so disposed. But they are not so disposed, but amicably acquiesce in an almost purely white government. That is partly because the whites treat the blacks with so much friendliness and equity that the blacks feel their interests to be quite safe in white men's hands without any need of their own self-assertion; and partly because the negroes have no particular taste or aptitude for politics, while the white Panamans are born politicians and possess the genius of government in an eminent degree. So long as matters remain in their present general condition, therefore, we need fear for Panama none of the brutal race conflicts which have
IMPRACTICABLE COLONISTS

disgraced America from New York to Texas. But if from fifty to seventy-five thousand negro labourers were permanently colonised in Panama, and were made citizens of the state, Panama would be made a "black republic" almost as much as Hayti is to-day. With negro voters outnumbering the whites more than two to one, the opportunity for ill-advised or unscrupulous ambition would be dangerously great, and we should probably soon see there a political and social war of races which would be disastrous to the property and progress of Panama, and embarrassing in a great degree to our own administration of the Canal Zone.

If then we rule out the yellow and black races from extensive colonisation in Panama, whence are the tens of thousands of recruits to be drawn? There have been various suggestions, chiefly futile. I have heard it gravely proposed that colonies of Russian refugees, Jews or others, should be planted there. Some Russians have, I believe, settled in Mexico and are reported to be doing well. But the idea of transplanting extensive communities from sub-arctic to tropical latitudes does not commend itself to reason. Another suggestion was that Boers should be brought from South Africa. From the climatic point of view that seems not impracticable, for the Transvaal lies within the semitropical zone. But the Boers are, of course, not sufficiently numerous to provide the labour needed at Panama without depopulating their own land of all save those whom they used to call Outlanders; they indicate no desire to emigrate in any considerable numbers; and they would certainly prove irreconcilably antagonistic to the Panamans, and uncommonly difficult for American administrators to deal with. The hosts of emigrants from Europe who now come to our shores are, with the exception of the Italians, unsuited for labour in the tropics. For the same reason, of course, we must rule out our own people, the white men of the United States. I have been confronted with the inquiry why, if we are eliminating yellow fever and making the Isthmus healthful, an army of American labourers cannot safely go
thither and do the work. The answer is easy. We can make Panama sanitary, but we cannot make it temperate in climate. Tropical it is and tropical it will remain; and Americans will not and cannot successfully engage in habitual and severe manual exertion in the tropics. Moreover, Americans who can earn high wages at home will not go to Panama to work for low wages. Engineers, foremen, draughtsmen, and the large clerical force, can, of course, be taken from the United States, and in such capacities there are and will be many desirable opportunities for young Americans of ability and character, and of common sense enough to live in proper fashion in the tropics and not get hobnails on their livers through recklessness in food and drink. But American workingmen have no call to Panama, any more than English workingmen have to the plains of India.

There remain the peoples of the two great southern peninsulas of Europe. Spain is not commonly thought of as a land of considerable emigration. Its less than 19,000,000 people do not overcrowd it. Nor do we regard the Spanish as a conspicuously industrial race. Yet, in fact, many Spaniards do go abroad each year, and they are capable of splendid efficiency in industrial pursuits, even in the hardest forms of manual labour. It might not be possible to get anything like a sufficient number of workingmen from Spain. If it were possible it would be a most advantageous thing to do, and it would be well in any case to encourage as large an immigration to Panama from Spain as may be secured; because such colonists would be in admirable accord with the existing population of Panama, and would make a homogeneous and harmonious addition thereto.

The Italians have already been mentioned. Their splendid physical efficiency is amply known in the United States, as are also their devotion to duty, their ambition, their frugality, and their adaptability to new modes of life. They would probably get along well with the Panamans, and would form a valuable addition to the permanent population of the Isthmus. Of their ability to endure the climate there need be
little question. Each year now sees hundreds of thousands of them go abroad, chiefly to the United States and to Argentina and Brazil. It would be an admirable stroke of policy, from every point of view, to divert a part of that great stream of migration from our own shores to Panama. We do not need so many Italians here, and we do need them in Panama, and Panama needs them to cultivate her waste places and to transform the jungles into gardens.

Such are the possible—and impossible—sources of labour, if that labour is to remain permanently in Panama. There remains the other course, less desirable, of securing a sufficient force of workmen for the construction of the canal, with the understanding that when that task is done they will depart from the Isthmus. That plan must be adopted if suitable permanent colonists cannot be found, and in that case it will probably be best to look to China for a supply. It is true that Panama has a strict Chinese exclusion law, which it will probably be necessary to maintain. But even with that law in force it would be easy to make a contract with some of the great Chinese companies, for the supplying of so many thousand labourers, who would live at Panama within a certain pale, and when their work there was done would return to China. Precisely such an arrangement has been effected in South Africa for the working of mines, and, despite the political campaign clamour which has been raised against it, it seems to be reasonably successful and satisfactory. I can see no convincing argument against the adoption of such a system at Panama, while the arguments in its favour are many, obvious, and strong. There can be no doubt of the ability of the Chinese to endure the climate and to do the work with marked efficiency. Their labour would be inexpensive, and they would be exceptionally trustworthy and easy to govern; while their return home could be much more readily and certainly assured than that of any other temporary levy.

We must remember, too, that we are not merely doing at Panama an immense physical work that is to endure, under
our control and responsibility, for all time. We are also entering into political and social relations with an alien people, and those relations, in some form, are to endure for all time. Concerning that feature of the case, of unsurpassed interest and importance, three things may be asserted with confidence. One is, that we do not wish to annex Panama, nor to subvert nor interfere with its autonomy further than is provided in our treaty with that republic and in its own Constitution. The second is, that we do intend to maintain our protectorate over Panama and our special and exclusive privileges—and responsibilities—there. The third is, that we desire these relations to be maintained in a spirit of mutual amity, confidence, and contentment. It would be a most unwelcome—I might almost say, an abhorrent—thing to be compelled for any reason to reduce Panama to the condition of a subject province, or to add it to the category of those alien possessions which were forced upon us by the logic of an unsought war, and which are to us to-day a "white man's burden" which is heavy and costly to bear—though we shall doubtless bear it unflinchingly as long as necessity or duty may require. It would be no less unpitiful for us to lose our hold upon the Isthmus in any way; the hold which we have had, for its profit and our own, not merely since the treaty of 1904, but since the treaty of 1846 was signed. Assuredly, it would be intolerable to have our permanent relations with Panama incessantly or even periodically marked with friction and irritation.

How, then, are we to insure the permanence of pleasant relations between America and Panama? I would answer, first of all, that we must treat Panama with justice. The Panaman sense of justice is as highly cultivated, and the Panaman sensitiveness to and resentment of injustice are as keen, as our own. I shall never forget an incident of Secretary Taft’s visit to Panama in 1904—to which I have already devoted a chapter. At the state banquet in his honour on the evening of December 1, at which were present the representative men of Panama, of all parties, he said in the