tion, without including a provision for their adjudication by an impartial tribunal.

In view of the foregoing, what are we to think about the threats our Administration sent to Colombia? Let us reason together. An appropriate analogy is an aid to clear thinking and so we will use the following: If at the time that the United States Senate was considering the first Hay-Pauncefote treaty, Great Britain had sent us warnings similar to those we sent Colombia, what would our Congress have done? The Senate would have peremptorily rejected the Hay-Pauncefote treaty; and Congress would have immediately abrogated the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. Congress would then have proceeded with the Isthmian canal project in complete disregard of Great Britain. Yet our Administration in 1903 addressed communications to a friendly nation that we would have treated with scorn if they had been addressed to us. These warnings were reprehensible and provocative of the course that Colombia thereafter pursued. No self-respecting nation will yield to coercion.

What did Colombia do? She declined to ratify the Hay-Herran treaty, after provocation. We declined to ratify the first Hay-Pauncefote treaty. The latter caused delay in entering upon canal
construction. History shows that our Senate acted with wisdom when it amended the first Hay-Pauncefote treaty. If a treaty is a solemn engagement, it is important that all of its provisions should be properly scrutinized—especially if it is to run in perpetuity without any provision for readjustment of its terms. Why this haste on our part? Why? It is now evident that procedure by the orderly processes of public law would have given proper results. Colombia desired to do what we did when we amended the first Hay-Pauncefote treaty. Our conduct, of course, was beneficent; that of Colombia was base! Who commissioned Roosevelt to be the mentor of civilization?

Coercion solidified Colombian sentiment against the ratification of the Hay-Herran treaty. The maintenance of Colombian dignity assumed paramount importance in the deliberations of the Colombian Senate. Both friend and foe of the treaty voted against ratification. A unanimous vote against ratification was the answer of the Colombian Senate to the attempted coercion by our Government. History, while pointing the unmoving finger of scorn at our Administration, will, at the same time, vindicate the action of the Colombian Senate.
The Panama Canal, as an actuality, is a monument to the genius of our engineers. Would that it could be said of Roosevelt that he: "Nothing common did or mean, upon that memorable scene," when he took the Canal Zone and let the Congress debate the act after the deed! Would that it could be said that he exercised the patience of Job and displayed the wisdom of Solomon in the negotiations to secure an adequate title to the Canal Zone! As already stated, an adequate title could have been secured by the proper diplomatic methods as it was in the interest of Colombia to come to an understanding with the United States so that the construction of the most colossal enterprise ever undertaken by man could be prosecuted with vigor.

It is infinitely better for a nation to forego the construction of a canal on its territory than to lose its honor and self-respect by yielding to coercion. Craven cowardice is an unfailing sign of either national decadence or national degeneracy. A nation that fails to protect its honor, a nation that fails to restore its honor when sullied, can not be the important factor in the advancement of mankind that it otherwise would be. Let us hope that the United States, rich and powerful, will take its honor out of pawn by mak-
ing reparation to Colombia. Unless this is done she is likely to remain an Ismaelite among the nations of the Western Hemisphere.

The dismemberment of Colombia by the United States was an offense against international law, a violation of a solemn engagement and an embarrassment to Spanish-America. It is an offense which is not in the slightest degree palliated by the warnings to Colombia. A warning does not excuse an unlawful act; rather does it aggravate the deed; it is included in the offense. Our warnings to Colombia are merely the forerunner of collaboration with the separatists on the Isthmus to effect the secession of the Province of Panama from Colombia. A nation, not unlike an individual, that resorts to coercion is on dangerous ground. Roosevelt carried it to the point where he could not retreat without humiliation, or proceed without stultifying his Administration. He had to make good according to his ethics. How could he? By an understanding, direct or by proxy, with the separatists on the Isthmus. This was effected through Bunau-Varilla as intermediary, the separatists playing the part allotted to them, and our Administration doing the rest. Our gunboats were the means employed to effect the dismemberment of Colombia. It was our
Roosevelt Attempted to Coerce Colombia

navy that made possible the establishment of the so-called Republic of Panama. It was the assurance of protection by the United States that caused the separatists to proceed with the projected secession of the Province of Panama from Colombia. These statements will be substantiated in the next chapter. They are the fruit of attempted coercion—the last step in the process of using chicane, instead of the method approved by modern diplomacy, to secure the Canal Zone.

Try coercion on your neighbor and see how it works. You will then be in a position to understand the procedure described in this and the three following chapters which tell how the Roosevelt Administration "took" the Canal Zone.
Chapter IV

The "Vaudeville" Revolution on the Isthmus

Was there a real revolution on the Isthmus of Panama in the fall of 1903? This is a vital question. It must be answered before passing judgment on the Roosevelt Administration. If, upon a searching examination, it appears that there was only a make-believe revolution and not an actual uprising, the conduct of our Administration at that time becomes brigandage under a veneer of respectability. If it appears that there was no revolution on the Isthmus at the time, the acts of our Administration must be disowned and reparation must be made to Colombia or the act will become for all time the nation's act. We will now show that there was no revolution on the Isthmus at the time.

As already stated, there was no real revolution in the Province of Panama in the fall of 1903 when the latter was organized into an independent state under the protection of the United States. Those interested in secession es-
established a nominal government independent of that of Colombia on November 4, 1903. The independence of the nominal government was recognized by the United States on November 6, 1903. This was two days before the Government of Colombia learned of the secession of its choicest province. The rape of Colombia was completed two days before the Colombian Government received information of the occurrences on the Isthmus. American vessels of war were ordered to Isthmian waters before the event to protect secession against attack by Colombia, and to safeguard the establishing of a government in the Province, which was to be a protectorate of the United States.

Assurance that the American navy would be used to protect secession and to assure its success were conveyed to the Separatists of Panama by Bunau-Varilla. We will show that this assurance was given to him by the Roosevelt Administration. Had not this assurance been given, the separatists would not have proceeded with the secession of the Province and there would be no so-called "Republic of Panama" today.

The foregoing statement is a severe indictment of our then Government. It is so far-
reaching that it is an unpardonable libel unless it rests on a basis of fact. We will now marshal the facts on which this indictment is based.

We are dealing only incidentally with the post-secession activities of our then Administration. We are dealing primarily with its ante-secession activities. These were so improper that it sought to conceal them. It is now established that secession was predicated on them and was proceeded with only because of the arrival of the Nashville—tangible evidence of assured protection. In short, there was no revolution or intention to promote a revolution. There was to be secession if the United States would guarantee its success. Secession eventuated and the protection was furnished. The so-called Republic of Panama is mute evidence of pre-arrangement (of an adequate understanding) between the Roosevelt Administration and the separatists of Panama.

Some statements crystallize a story—give it objectivity so that it can be seen in a flash. Such a statement is the one made by Roosevelt to the students of the University of California. As reported it reads:

I am interested in the Panama Canal because I started it. If I had followed traditional, conservative methods,
I would have submitted a dignified state paper of probably two hundred pages to Congress, and the debate on it would have been going on yet; but *I took the Canal Zone* and let Congress debate; and while the debate goes on the canal does also.

Another such statement is the following by Roosevelt:

> I did not lift my finger to incite the revolutionists. The right simile to use is totally different. I simply ceased to stamp out the different revolutionary fuses that were already burning.

These statements are charged with information that their author did not intend to disclose, but which a mind conversant with Isthmian events of the time automatically supplies. There were no revolutionary fuses on the Isthmus at the time. There was merely effort to secure advance assurance of protection of secession by the United States. It succeeded. Therefore, the observation would be correct if it had stated that the separatists were assured that the American Administration would prevent Colombia from putting out the fuse—that secession would be protected within forty-eight hours after the Declaration of Independence.

Bunau-Varilla was in conference with our Administration on October 16, 1903. On October
17, he addressed Doctor Amador, first President of the Republic of Panama, as follows:

I can give you the assurance that you will be protected by the American forces forty-eight hours after you have proclaimed the new Republic on the whole Isthmus.

The real story of the opera bouffe revolution on the Isthmus in the fall of 1903 can best be told by commencing with the account of it by Bunau-Varilla. It is found in his book: “Panama, the Creation, Destruction and Resurrection,” pages 289-342.

When it became apparent that the fate of the Hay-Herran treaty hung in the balance, an inner circle in the city of Panama commenced to consider secession. Their first endeavor was to ascertain if the cooperation of the United States could be secured. William Nelson Cromwell was consulted. He undertook to arrange it.

Results were satisfactory. Warning reached him from the seat of government of Colombia. He was counsel for the French company. Their interests had been placed in jeopardy by his activities. He had to retire from ostensible connection with the venture. So Bunau-Varilla was summoned from France. The continuity
of the movement was not interrupted. Bunau-Varilla started where Cromwell left off.

What transpired at the conference above mentioned is not of record. We have the *ipse dixit* of Roosevelt. Events, however, stand in a causal relation. Actions speak louder than words. The events that followed in precise coördination tell the story as clearly as though a full record had been kept. No revolution could have been planned and carried out with such clockwork precision without a perfect understanding between the parties in interest. The separatists of Panama had foreknowledge of the intentions of the Roosevelt Administration. There was but one person who could have given them that foreknowledge, and that was the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy.

On September 23, the Hay-Herran treaty expired. It had been rejected August 12 by the Colombian Senate. This was the psychological moment for decisive action. So Bunau-Varilla appears on the scene. Colombia had not yielded to coercion. To coerce her by force would require the coöperation of the Congress. With the Nicaragua route available, Congress would hesitate and would probably refuse to concur. Hence, collaboration with the separatists offered
the solution. Bunau-Varilla's presence offered the opportunity. Later events show that this was the method adopted.

Bunau-Varilla states in the book named, that he inferred what the action of the Roosevelt Administration would be in the event of an uprising in Panama. He gives the facts on which he based the inference. On thorough investigation, the writer finds that the facts are other than as stated by the author named, and would have forced a conclusion other than the one given. The actual facts would have compelled the inference that the United States would expect Colombia to maintain free and uninterrupted transit, and that she would be given a free hand to quell any uprising. This is what had transpired theretofore. Nothing could have been inferred save that the United States would respect Colombia's sovereignty. Therefore he could have got the information which he claims to have possessed only by being told. Only the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy could have told him, either directly or by proxy, that is, the President.

Men do not risk their lives, their property and the welfare of their families in a wild-goose chase after a revolution; nor does an outsider risk prop-
The known facts plainly show that there was an understanding between our then Administration and Bunau-Varilla, and that the latter was the intermediary for communicating with the separatists of Panama. Bunau-Varilla’s explanation transforms suspicion into knowledge, and establishes collusion between our Administration and the separatists of Panama.

The status of secession as of September 22, 1903, can be inferred from a conversation between Bunau-Varilla, who had just arrived in New York from France, and an M. Lindo, a merchant of New York and Panama. It is given in Bunau-Varilla’s book on Panama. We will reproduce it in the form of a dialogue, preserving the exact words reported:

Bunau-Varilla—Well, is the rumor true that the people of Panama are going to make a revolution?
M. Lindo—They have no financial means. . . . Without money a revolution cannot be brought about any more than a war. But if you care to know what the situation really is, I will ask Amador to come and see you. . . . He has come precisely to obtain the means of bringing about a revolution. But he has failed, and is sailing for Panama in a few days. He will tell you all. He is in despair.

This seems to show that something resembling
a revolution had been contemplated, and that it was to be abandoned for lack of assured support from the United States. But the time limit for the ratification of the Hay-Herran treaty expired the next day. Perhaps our Administration would after that give the desired assurance.

On the following day (September 23), Bunau-Varilla met Doctor Amador in conference. In his book, Bunau-Varilla tells the story that Doctor Amador told him. The following is a correct transcript of the narrative as recorded in the section of the book devoted to demonstrating that he (Bunau-Varilla) and not Roosevelt is the foster-father of the so-called uprising on the Isthmus:

During the past year a group of citizens of the Isthmus, of whom I was one, have met together to consider the measures to be taken if Colombia rejected the Hay-Herran treaty.

We one and all agreed that such a decision would stop all activity, ruin the inhabitants, and within a few years again transform the Isthmus into a virgin forest.

Confronted by a decision so despotic, we decided to prepare for an armed combat, rather than submit passively to the tyrant's sentence of death.

But Colombia was capable of crushing all resistance: as its power is enormously superior to that of the Province of Panama. Consequently we turned our eyes towards the great American Republic. She also had an interest in making an effective protest in the presence of
the extraordinary tide of the Colombian sentiment against the execution of the Canal.

Why should not this great Republic, so rich, so powerful, give the necessary cooperation in money and in military force?

This idea seemed to us so reasonable that we decided to entrust with a mission to the United States a certain Beers, more generally known by the name of Captain Beers.

He was an employee of the Panama Railroad. His mission consisted in visiting the right person in order to learn whether this double support could be obtained.

The persons whom Beers saw assured him that nothing was easier and they promised to obtain all that we asked for. Captain Beers came back to Panama to tell of the happy result of his mission.

Our friends then decided to delegate two of their number in order to reach a final understanding. I was one of the two delegates. As soon as I arrived I was received with open arms by the persons whom Captain Beers had seen. I was to go to Washington to see Mr. Hay, Secretary of State, in order to conclude the final transaction.

But suddenly the attitude of the person who was to take me to Washington entirely changed.

Whenever I went to see him strict orders had been given to the effect that he was not in. I had to install myself in the hall, to camp there, and, so to speak, besiege his office. Nothing resulted from it. And there I am. All is lost. At any moment the conspiracy may be discovered and my friends judged, sentenced to death, and their property confiscated. I at first decided to return to Panama to share their fate. But I am hesitating. If my friends are shot I prefer to devote my life to avenging them on the man who will have been the cause of their deaths.

There is to-day only a weak Colombian garrison at
Panama. Moreover, these men who have been living for many years on the Isthmus have ceased to count as foreigners to us. Our emotions, our aspirations, are theirs. Their general, Huertas, a valiant soldier, who has his troops well in hand, is himself shocked at the way Colombia is behaving towards Panama.

A revolution would to-day meet with no obstacle. But the Colombians have the command of the sea; their ships' crews are loyal. We must first, therefore, acquire a fleet to prevent Colombia from overwhelming with her troops the Province of Panama.

Besides this we want arms. It was to obtain ships and arms that I have come here. Our first envoy, Captain Beers, had been assured, and the same pledge was repeated to me when I came, that the United States would give us all the money we needed to buy arms and ships and pay the troops. . . . We need $6,000,000.

Let it be noted that it was September 23, 1903, when Dr. Amador told the story just described. At that time only a few citizens of the Isthmus had considered revolution. No effort had been made to promote discontent on the Isthmus. No effort had been made to promote a general uprising. No preparation had yet been made for an organized revolt. Real revolutions are not the product of such methods. An Isthmus "seething with revolution" was not an element of the success. Protection of secession by an adequate fleet was the only method that was considered. Our navy had such a fleet, and the Canal Zone was in the Province of Panama. The only prep-
The Vaudeville Revolution on Isthmus

aration needed was a bargain—an understanding. Our Administration had what the separatists on the Isthmus needed to succeed (a fleet) and they offered what we wanted (the Canal Zone).

The secessionists needed warships to control the sea in order to prevent Colombia from landing troops on the Isthmus. There was no other way in which Colombia could send troops to maintain her sovereignty. The United States had the warships. The money in the provincial treasury, with the amount to be advanced by Bunau-Varilla ($100,000), was enough to purchase official Colombia domiciled on the Isthmus. Therefore, if Colombia could be prevented from landing additional troops on the Isthmus, the success of secession was assured in advance. This was the program. There was no need of the Isthmus being aflame with revolution to carry it out. It was only necessary that our Administration should be “seething with revolution.”

The foregoing excerpt shows the hopeless condition of the so-called revolution on September 23. It was predicated on the conditional support of the United States. Seemingly no assurance had as yet been secured. Such assurance was necessary to give it vitality. Was it secured?

There is unmistakable evidence that Bunau-
Varilla had foreknowledge of adequate military and naval support. He claims to have played a rôle similar to that of Sherlock Holmes, and to have found it out without having been told. His narrative, however, supplies the missing links that connect our Administration with the collaboration in which secession was arranged.

In the time intervening between September 23 and October 10, Bunau-Varilla sounded our Administration. He tells us in the accounts of his conferences what he wants us to believe and not what actually transpired. We find in his Sherlock Holmes tale as given in his book the following:

I left the private office of the President [October 10, 1903] in possession of all the elements necessary for action.

I had at last the direct confirmation of the inductions which thus far I had drawn solely from pure reasoning: the President of the United States was holding firm for Panama.

If a revolution were to generate new conditions favorable to the acquisition of the Canal Zone by the United States, President Roosevelt would immediately seize the opportunity . . . [interesting! interesting!].

It remained for me to discover the second unknown quantity. How could a revolution be made successfully at Panama without the financial cooperation of the United States, and without the express promise of her military support? . . .

The great and apparently unsurmountable obstacle was
the obtaining of a sum of $6,000,000 for the necessary armament. In trying to reduce this demand of Amador, the light suddenly flashed across my mind during my railway journey back to New York.

What was going to be the use of this $6,000,000, according to Amador? To buy ships, which would be equipped for war in order to sink Colombian ships, and to prevent the transportations of troops!

But where were these military movements to be feared? Was it in the Isthmus itself? By no means, because the Treaty of 1846 gave the United States the right, and imposed upon her the duty, of turning any belligerents away from the line of transit.

Bunau-Varilla concluded that the $6,000,000 were not needed as the United States under the Treaty of 1846 was obligated to prohibit fighting within the zone of the railroad, and that that would automatically prevent Colombia from maintaining her sovereignty over the area needed for canal purposes. Is this construction of the Treaty of 1846 correct? Suffice it to say that the construction of this Treaty from its adoption to the assumption of the Presidency by Theodore Roosevelt is contained in a letter addressed to our Minister in Bogotá by Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish. It reads:

By the Treaty of 1846 with New Granada this Government has engaged to guarantee the neutrality of the Isthmus of Panama. This engagement, however, has never been acknowledged to embrace the duty of protecting the road across it from the violence of local factions;
but it is regarded as the undoubted duty of the Colombian Government to protect it against attacks from local insurgents.

You are consequently requested to address a representation upon this subject to the Colombian minister for foreign affairs, and to ask that a sufficient force be kept on the Isthmus to deter attacks upon the road.

Instead of it being the duty of the United States to exclude the sovereign, Colombia, from the line of railroad for military purposes she was, in accordance with the earlier construction of the Treaty of 1846, obligated not to interfere with her in the maintenance of order on the Isthmus. If the guarantee of the United States under the Treaty of 1846 during the fifty-five years that it had then been in force did not lead to independence—especially in 1885 and in 1899-1902, when there were formidable revolts—how could it be expected to do so in 1903 without any preparation whatever? Bunau-Varilla nowhere explains. We will again quote from his book:

I had myself seen the United States, in 1885, performing her duty and preventing any fighting in this zone [between the watersheds of the Chagres and of the Panaman Rio Grande]. . . .

It may be remembered that in 1885 a Revolutionary army commanded by General Aizpuru had seized Panama. The town once taken, the American troops had entered Panama to prevent disorder. But when it was seen that the Revolutionary Government was maintain-
ing order, the American forces were withdrawn, and they confined themselves to garrisoning the railroad and its wharf, the sole [interesting with a?] means of communication with the Pacific Ocean.

Some days later, two ships laden with Government troops tried to land at the wharf.

General Reyes, who commanded the Colombian troops, was invited to withdraw, and the landing was forbidden by Commander McCalla.

I had seen with my own eyes, therefore, in 1885, the Revolution protected from the aggression of the Government troops by the American military authorities.

The foregoing is a garbled and grossly inaccurate account of the Isthmian events in the spring of 1885. It shows a deliberate attempt to bear false witness in order to dissipate the suspicion resting on the Roosevelt Administration for complicity in the Isthmian disturbance of 1903. We will let official documents tell the actual story. The first is a telegram from the Secretary of the Navy, Whitney, to Rear Admiral Jouett, dated April 3, 1885. It was sent because an American steamship had been seized at Colon, its cargo had been taken from her, and her officers and the American consul had been imprisoned. The parts bearing on the subject matter under consideration read:

The duty you are called upon to perform calls for the exercise of great discretion. The object of the expedition is the protection by the United States of its citizens,
to preserve the neutrality and keep open the transit from Colon to Panama, and further to protect the lives and property of American citizens. . . . You have no part to perform in the political or social disorder of Colombia, and it will be your duty to see that no irritation or unfriendliness shall arise from your presence at the Isthmus.

Thus events that had transpired were to be adjusted through diplomatic channels. The Rear Admiral was sent to protect American interests without offense to the sovereign, Colombia. The following telegram from Rear Admiral Jouett to Commander McCalla, dated April 17, 1885, clinches this point:

In order to preserve the strict neutrality of the Isthmus of Panama, and to avoid interruption to the transit, you will please prevent any insurgent force from landing or operating in this vicinity.

The United States clearly recognized that the rights of the sovereign were supreme. Her efforts to protect American lives and property and to keep the line of transit open were in cooperation with the sovereign. Only the insurgents were restrained. This point is reënforced in a telegram sent by Rear Admiral Jouett to Secretary Whitney, dated April 17, 1885. In this telegram, the Rear Admiral informed the Secretary of his arrival, and states:
As Colonel Ulloa was the only representative of the Colombian Government in this vicinity, I immediately addressed a letter to him, informing him of my arrival and requesting his permission to land men for the protection of American lives and property and preserving the free transit of the Isthmus. He replied that he could see no objection to landing the men, and that he would forward my letter to the Government at Bogotá.

In 1885 the United States asked permission to land forces on the Isthmus. The rights of the sovereign were respected. In 1903, the sovereign was prohibited from landing forces on the Isthmus for the maintenance of order. In 1885 the sovereign was accorded every facility to establish order.

Thus the official documents completely discredit Bunau-Varilla. He had advance information that the United States would protect secession within forty-eight hours after the event. He is attempting to explain how he came thereby. Therefore, the importance of our discrediting him as the narrative unfolds. It will leave him with advance information—unexplained by him. In a communication to Secretary Whitney, dated April 18, 1885, Rear Admiral Jouett clearly states the spirit of American intervention:

Panama is still held by the insurgents, and until the Government forces reëstablish themselves in that city, serious disorder is likely to occur there at any time.
It is probable that the Government troops who have put down the revolution in the interior will soon come to Panama and take charge. In that event, I would advise the immediate withdrawal of one-half of the force sent by steamer from New York, and afterwards, as circumstances permit, the gradual reduction of our force to an establishment which can be maintained here without intermission.

Order was maintained by our forces until the Government succeeded in reestablishing its authority. This also shows that Bunau-Varilla is guilty of willful misrepresentation.

But, General Reyes, who commanded the Colombian troops, was prevented from landing certain troops just arrived. Again an official document will tell the true story. It is by Commander McCalla to the Commander-in-Chief of the Colombian forces at Panama, dated April 28, 1885, and reads:

I have the distinguished honor . . . to inform you that for the protection of the transit across the Isthmus, and for the protection of Americans and their property, I occupy the railroad station at this place with a United States naval force.

My lines for this purpose necessarily extend from the railroad wharves to the passenger station at the bridge.

May I beg leave to request that the national force under your command may be directed not to land within my lines.

I shall take the first opportunity of paying my respects to you; meanwhile I shall be most happy to place my personal services at your disposition.
The note from which the last quotation is made was transmitted by the agency of Lieutenant Reeder. During the conversation, General Reyes stated to Lieutenant Reeder that he was having the Rio Grande, south of the city, examined with the view of finding out whether he would be able to land his forces in the vicinity. They did land.

On the following day there was a conference attended by General Reyes for Colombia, General Aizpuru for the insurgents, and Rear Admiral Jouett. The conference resulted in an agreement being signed between General Reyes and General Aizpuru by which the latter agreed to surrender.

This shows that the American military authorities did not protect the insurgents. Bunau-Varilla's inference vanishes as the actual facts are stated.

*Our best witness is Grover Cleveland.* His word was as good as his bond throughout the length and breadth of the land. His message to the Congress in the following December leaves no doubt as to the course that the United States pursued. It completely disposes of the pretensions of Bunau-Varilla, and with it vanishes the inference. The section of the message devoted
to our intervention in the uprising on the Isthmus states:

Emergencies growing out of the civil war in the United States of Colombia demanded of the Government at the beginning of this Administration the employment of armed force to fulfill its guarantee under the thirty-fifth article of the Treaty of 1846, in order to keep the transit open across the Isthmus of Panama.

Desirous of exercising only the powers expressly reserved to us by the treaty, and mindful of the rights of Colombia, the forces sent to the Isthmus were instructed to confine their action to "positively and efficaciously" preventing the transit and its accessories from being "interrupted or embarrassed."

The execution of this delicate and responsible task necessarily involved police control where the local authority was temporarily powerless, but always in aid of the sovereignty in Colombia.

The prompt and successful fulfillment of its duty by this Government was highly appreciated by the Government of Colombia, and has been followed by expressions of its satisfaction. . . . The restoration of peace on the Isthmus by the reëstablishment of the constituted Government there being accomplished, the forces of the United States were withdrawn.

We have now shown that events on the Isthmus in the spring of 1885 were other than as stated by Bunau-Varilla. This is of controlling importance in our argument. It was the representations which he made to the separatists that caused secession. These representations indicated foreknowledge that the United States
would protect secession. These representations caused those interested in secession to proceed with the project. It is because of this fact that we give his explanation with great detail, and answer it with official documents woven into a narrative. We hope to leave him at the end of our argument securely in possession of the advance information which resulted in the establishment of the so-called Republic of Panama, and with a demolished explanation as to how he came by the information.

We will now sidestep the story of Bunau-Varilla until we have presented data which point to the correctness of the conclusion we are developing. This done, we will conclude the story of Bunau-Varilla and our interpretation of it.

We will commence with the statement made by Dr. Amador to General Amaya of Colombia on November 4, found in the report of the latter to the Colombian Minister of War dated November 14, 1903:

Dr. Amador, an old friend of mine, came to see me within a few hours of my being placed in jail, and he said to me textually, "You must understand that we who started this movement are not insane; we fully appreciated the fact that in no case could we withstand all the rest of the nation, and in consequence we had to resort
to means that, although painful, were indispensable. The United States has fully entered into this movement, and the Panamans are not alone, as in every event they will back up our actions. Not another Colombian soldier will ever disembark again on any of the coasts of the Isthmus, and our independence is guaranteed by that colossus.” He offered me his services and said that he wished to present his respects to my chief, to whom I heard him make similar assertions, which, unfortunately, were corroborated by the increasing number of warships of that power in both seas, and by the disembarkation of its forces to mock our weakness.

And yet, according to Roosevelt, the Isthmus was “seething with revolution!” We—some ten—who started this movement are not mad! There is no evidence that the Isthmus was “seething with revolution.” There is only evidence of duplicity. But, truth matches. Those who arranged and carried out secession from Panama to Washington cannot blot out history. The true story of the birth of the so-called Republic of Panama is being recorded. General Tovar, in his report to the Colombian Minister of War, dated November 20, 1903, states:

The solitary confinement in which I was kept from the afternoon of the 3d was broken on the evening of the following day by the visit which Señor Manuel Amador Guerrero, principal leader of the revolutionary movement, paid me in my prison. Dr. Amador, after having spoken with General Amaya, had me brought down from the room I occupied at police headquarters, and informed
me that events which had taken place on the previous evening were the result of a plan for a long time conceived and discussed at length in Panama and in Washington, and executed under the protection and guaranty of the Government of the United States with which he personally had recently come to an understanding... that in consequence it was ridiculous to suppose that the Panamans could have successfully defied the rest of the republic, and for the same reason all resistance on my part would be quite useless; that therefore I ought to order the reembarkation of the battalion *Tiradores* which remained in Colon, taking advantage for this purpose of the royal mail steam packet *Orinoco*, then in that port, and thus avoiding in a spirit of humanity the shedding of blood. At the same time he informed me that there were in Colon several American warships which had come to protect the revolutionary movement. I answered Señor Amador that I would take no account of what he had just told me, as my duty and the duty of the army I commanded was sufficiently clear, and that in consequence no human force could drag from me the order that he desired. I considered my conference with him at an end, and turned to be conducted back to my prison, where I learned that a similar proposition had been made to General Amaya, but without success.

Dr. Porras, one of the loyal Colombians on the Isthmus, was also arrested and confined in the police barracks. General Aizpuru of the municipal council of Panama called on him and told him that the separatists' movement was the work of only a few leaders. This dialogue as recorded in the hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Relations clinches the story of
collusion between our Administration and the separatists on the Isthmus. It starts with General Aizpuru saying:

Yes; but the Republic of Panama is an accomplished fact, as you will soon be convinced.

I cannot believe it [answered Doctor Porras]. Colombia will soon call Panama to account for her temerity and ingratitude.

The Government of Colombia will not be able to do anything in the matter [was Aizpuru's answer]. Panama is under the protection of the United States; if it were not it would have recognized its helplessness and would not have attempted its freedom.

We are now in a position to see why the newly arrived Colombian soldiers acted as they did. Instead of the entire Isthmus being aflame with revolution, an inner circle of Panama used with telling effect their assurance of the support of the United States and its tangible evidence—the presence of the Nashville and the refusal of the railroad company to transport troops. So Colonel Torres decided to reëmbark his soldiers for the return to Cartagena. The following telegram to Secretary Hay, dated November 5, 1903, speaks for itself:

All Colombian soldiers at Colon now, 7 p. m., going on board Royal Mail steamer returning to Cartagena. Vessel, supposed to be Dixie, in sight.

What was the effect of the presence of the
American marines on the Colombian troops at Colon? The following from an official communication of Commander Hubbard of the Nashville, dated November 5, 1903, tells the story:

I am positive that the determined attitude of our men, their coolness and evident intention of standing their ground, had a most salutary and decisive effect on the immediate situation, and was the initial step in the ultimate abandoning of Colon by these troops and their return to Cartagena the following day.

Does this sound like keeping the line of transit open? It had only been closed to the sovereign up to that time. The Isthmians were not prepared for military operations, and, therefore, there was no obstruction to transit threatened or imminent. This was the only time in the history of the Treaty of 1846 that troops of the sovereign were expelled from the Isthmus by our forces.

Our Administration clearly ordered the Nashville to Colon for the unlawful purpose of interfering with the sovereign rights of Colombia and of effecting her dismemberment. This is as repugnant to morality as collaboration with the separatists of Panama to effect the dismemberment of Colombia and to establish the so-called Republic of Panama. We will give the telegram to the commander of the Nashville, dated Novem-
ber 2, 1903, because of its significance when subjected to careful examination:

Maintain free and uninterrupted transit. If interruption threatened by armed force, occupy the line of railroad. Prevent landing of any armed force with hostile intent, either Government or insurgent, either at Colon, Porto Bello, or other point. Send copy of instructions to the senior officer present at Panama upon arrival of Boston. Have sent copy of instructions and have telegraphed Dixie to proceed with all possible dispatch from Kingston to Colon. Government force reported approaching the Isthmus in vessels. Prevent their landing if in your judgment this would precipitate a conflict.

On November 2, 1903, there were no insurgents in the Province of Panama. The Roosevelt Administration must have known—did know—that the separatists had no ships and so could not project a military movement by water. The order to the commander of the Nashville, therefore, was designed to prevent Colombia (the sovereign) from landing troops in her own territory. It was an order equivalent to assuring the success of secession before there was secession—before any Isthmians bore arms. The separatists were not prepared to bear arms. It was not on the program that they should. Secession was to be bloodless. Therefore, our marines were to be the military end of the so-called revolution. To hold that collaboration is not the
prelude to the foregoing does violence to reason and to common sense.

Before dealing with the change in the traditional American Isthmian policy, we will take a backward look, and, in so doing, get our bearings. Bunau-Varilla states that he assured the separatists that the United States would protect secession. We learn from those interested in secession that they acted on the assurance of Bunau-Varilla when it was supported by tangible evidence—the arrival of the *Nashville* at Colon on November 2, 1903. Dr. Amador, first President of the Republic of Panama, stated that they knew that the United States would not allow Colombia to attack them. The history of the United States in relation to the Treaty of 1846 shows that she would not intervene to keep the transit open save at the request of Colombia. The traditional American policy shows that Bunau-Varilla could not have inferred that the United States would protect secession, as the evidence points to the opposite conclusion. How did he become informed and who informed him? As already stated, the separatists staked their all on this knowledge. We know that their request for a man-of-war at Colon caused Bunau-Varilla to
hurry to Washington. He went to Washington for a sufficient reason, and not for a breath of Washington ozone. There was domiciled there the person who could order a man-of-war to Colon, and the man-of-war forthwith hastened to Colon with all possible speed. The conclusion is apparent. There was an understanding between Bunau-Varilla and our Administration. That is how he became informed. Isthmian events from November 2, to November 6, 1903, corroborate this conclusion. The military end of secession was on our gunboats, the civil government end of it was at Panama. Each party executed its allotted part.

The separatists at first thought they needed $6,000,000 for an effective revolution. They had to have vessels of war to prevent Colombia from landing her troops on the Isthmus. Resistance was otherwise deemed impossible. This shows a well-thought-out plan—a plan that depended for fulfillment on the coöperation of an adequate navy. Suddenly it was found that a few hundred thousand dollars (to persuade official Colombia on the Isthmus) was all that was needed. Why this change? There is a reason. It is not of record. It is, however, as indelibly written as if it had been committed to parchment.
Comparison of the instructions to our naval officers prior to those of November 2, 1903, with those from and after that date, tell the story as emphatically as any written record could.

The so-called revolution was designed in Panama. After the Hay-Herran treaty had been rejected by Colombia, the finishing touches were put on the project at Washington. It was coördinated in collaboration with our Administration. The only discordant note in its smooth execution was the appearance of Colombian troops earlier than expected, on November 3, 1903. This compelled such a modification of the plan that footprints were left which reveal collaboration.

We will now deal with the abandonment of our traditional Isthmian policy under the Treaty of 1846. We have already given the instructions to our naval officers in Isthmian waters during the administration of Grover Cleveland. They should perhaps be reread at this point so that the contrast between them and those of November 2, 1903, may be clearly seen. During McKinley's Administration the following telegram, dated July 25, 1900, was sent to our Consul at Panama:
You are directed to protest against any act of hostility which may involve or imperil the safe and peaceful transit of persons or property across the Isthmus of Panama. The bombardment of Panama would have this effect, and the United States must insist upon the neutrality of the Isthmus as guaranteed by the treaty.

This was simply a protest in advance of harm. It was merely a request that Colombia pursue a certain course. In it we find no evidence that it was then held that the United States could lawfully prevent Colombia from landing troops on the Isthmus.

This brings the dispatches to our naval officers in Isthmian waters down to the Roosevelt Administration. The telegram of November 20, 1901, to our Consul at Panama first demands attention:

Notify all parties molesting or interfering with free transit across the Isthmus that such interference must cease and that the United States will prevent the interruption of traffic upon the railroad. Consult with captain of the Iowa, who will be instructed to land marines, if necessary, for the protection of the railroad, in accordance with the treaty rights and obligations of the United States. Desirable to avoid bloodshed, if possible.

This order merely demanded that interruption of the Isthmian transit cease, and provided the means for the order's enforcement. It clearly recognized the duty of the sovereign to protect
the transit in the first instance. The United States would intervene only in case of necessity.

The order sent by Secretary Hay to Commander Perry of the *Iowa*, dated November 20, 1901, reads:

Notify all persons, including leader insurgents, interference with transit must immediately cease, otherwise you will land force and maintain free transit and telegraphic communications.

The result of the order last given is shown in a telegram by Commander Perry to Secretary Long, dated November 21, 1901:

Everything quiet. No further interference since notification. Transit and telegraphic communication open. Shall land force if there should be further interference. Colon in possession of liberals and quiet.

The truth of the matter is that the contending forces feared the United States to such an extent that battles would halt to permit trains to pass, and be resumed when these were beyond the zone of conflict. Because of this fact, it was found necessary to employ American forces on the Isthmus only 164 days, from the date of the supersed- ing of the New Granada government by that of Colombia, to November, 1903. During the 164 days traffic on the Panama railroad was merely irregular, but not suspended. When this slight
inconvenience is contrasted with the benefits which accrued to the United States under the Treaty of 1846, it is wholly negligible.

Such was the situation when the formidable telegrams of November 2, 1903, were sent to our naval forces in, or presently to be in, Isthmian waters. Roosevelt’s wrath toward Colombia can only be referred to as “Much Ado About Nothing.”

The following telegram by Commander McCrea to Secretary Long, dated November 24, 1901, is apropos as it occurred during the Roosevelt Administration:

Gunboat Pinzon here with 600 troops. Have forbidden bombardment until non-combatants can be removed. Have requested Liberals not to fire on Pinzon without attempted landing. Shall landing with incidental firing be permitted at American wharves? Request instructions.

He was not instructed to prevent the vessel named from landing within fifty miles of Panama! The Roosevelt Administration was not seeking title to the Canal Zone from insurgents at that time. What a difference! The orders and instructions to the fall of 1902 (we will deal with those of 1902 in another chapter of this book) were in accordance with Colombia’s understanding of the Treaty of 1846. They
sought, in authorized ways, to safeguard Isthmian transit from actual interruption, and constituted no assault upon either the supreme jurisdiction or the supremely free action of Colombia. The instructions of November 2, 1903, grossly violated each of the foregoing. They had prime reference to a mythical political insurrection against Colombia’s territorial integrity and national control, with no reference whatsoever to transit interruption. They laid violent hands on Colombia’s sovereignty and forcibly prevented her from taking precautionary measures. Colombia was suddenly and peremptorily restrained from making free disposition of her own troops on her own soil.

The separatists of Panama knew that if they would go through the trifling acts of raising a flag and of adopting a Declaration of Independence, the American Navy would do the rest. Then they could proceed to organize a civil government while the American Navy would patrol Isthmian waters and prevent Colombia from interfering with the establishment of the so-called Republic of Panama. And this is the Province of Panama that was “seething with Revolution”! A microscope would have been needed to discover it.
The altered instructions to our men-of-war in Isthmian waters disclose design. The lack of domestic preparation for resistance to Colombia shows that the Junta knew the design. How did they become informed? Who could have informed them? There was but one person that could alter the traditional instructions to our naval commanders, and that was the Commander-in-Chief of our Army and Navy—the President.

The Senate, by a resolution dated January 22, 1904, asked the President to inform them as to when the United States forces were used in fulfillment of the Treaty of 1846, (1) at the request of the sovereign, (2) on its own initiative. The reply was prepared by Acting-Secretary of State Francis B. Loomis. It shows that during the fifty-five years that the treaty was in force, the American forces were used seven times, and that only once were they landed on our own initiative, and even at that time the Colombian Government was duly notified. This was in 1902, that is, during the Roosevelt Administration. The Colombian official on the Isthmus protested. This construction of the Treaty of 1846 was not acquiesced in by Colombia, and was the controlling reason for its rejection of the Hay-Herran treaty. It, therefore, cannot serve as a precedent for the
action of 1903, which is indeed without a precedent.

In Senate Document No. 143, Second Session, Fifty-eighth Congress, we find Acting-Secretary Loomis' summary after a detailed answer to the foregoing request of the Senate. It is as follows:

It appears from the correspondence transmitted here-with that on one occasion United States forces were landed solely on the initiative of the United States—namely, in September, 1902—when the Panama authorities were duly notified of the proposed landing.

The telegrams of November 2, 1903, are without a precedent in American Diplomatic history. For them, American history offers no counterpart and international law no sanction. They are *sui generis*. They violated the constitution of the United States, international law and the Treaty of 1846. This will be shown in other chapters of this book.

While the separatists on the Isthmus were still in doubt—were trying to resolve the unknown factor in the situation, that is, the attitude of our Government, the *Nashville* was speeding to Colon. Sight of it would resolve the doubt and precipitate secession. Before their decision was rendered, the following dispatches were sent to
the Commanders of our men-of-war which were to be in Isthmian waters on and after November 2, 1903. To those on the west coast:

Maintain free and uninterrupted transit. If interruption is threatened by armed force, occupy the line of railroad. Prevent landing of any armed force with hostile intent, either Government or insurgent, at any point within 50 miles of Panama. Government force reported approaching the Isthmus in vessels. Prevent their landing if, in your judgment, the landing would precipitate a conflict.

To those on the east coast:

Maintain free and uninterrupted transit. If interruption is threatened by armed force, occupy line of railroad. Prevent landing of any armed force with hostile intent, either government or insurgent, either at Colon, Porto Bello or other point.

Roosevelt characterizes his course on the Isthmus at this time as follows:

Not only was the course followed as regards Panama right in every detail, but there could have been no variation from that course except for the worse. We not only did what was technically justifiable, but we did what was demanded by every ethical consideration, national and international.

Our counterpart of this characterization is, in the words of Treitschke:

A thing that is wholly a sham cannot, in this universe of ours, endure forever. It may endure for a day, but its doom is certain.
The explanations of Isthmian events by Roosevelt and by Bunau-Varilla are wholly a sham. They are contravened by facts. The facts have not suffered; the explanations have been reduced to historical scrap.

Bunau-Varilla, Roosevelt, Amador and others interested in Isthmian secession have not profited by the sage advice of one Bill Devery, "When caught with the goods on, say nothing." They have talked too much. As already shown, that which is true matches—the rest is scrap. That which matches is the true story of the rape of Colombia by the United States.

We will now resume the story of Bunau-Varilla. He was telling how he inferred that the Roosevelt Administration would protect secession. We sidestepped his narrative in order to introduce data in support of our contention that his story is an invention.

Bunau-Varilla knew what the Administration would do in the event of the secession of the Province of Panama. He has told us in his book, and it is independently established. Statements by several of the separatists show that they acted upon his assurance. This is corroborated by the character of Isthmian preparation, which was
preparation for taking over the civil government of the Province of Panama. There was no military preparation such as we find when a real revolution is projected. The secession of the Province of Panama, was, therefore, due solely to foreknowledge that the Roosevelt Administration would protect secession.

Bunau-Varilla has told us how he became informed. We are showing that he did not become informed in the way he has told us. His statements crumble when examined by historical methods. What then is the source of his advance information? Established facts will unerringly reveal the source.

The revolution was to be bloodless, we are told! The uprising was to cover the Canal Zone and the canal littoral—the line of the railroad. Bunau-Varilla is our authority. Ah! The Isthmus was not "seething with revolution." A few men could determine the extent of the territory it would cover. But the whole Isthmus arose as one man! Roosevelt has told us. These are statements of practical men. The one desired to vindicate Roosevelt; the other sought to justify precipitate intervention by showing that an entire population arose and threw off the yoke of oppression. They can't have it both ways.
If the Isthmus was "seething with revolution," Bunau-Varilla did not tell the truth. If the revolution could have been confined to the Canal Zone and the canal littoral, Roosevelt did not tell the truth.

We will let Bunau-Varilla continue his story. We read in his book on Panama:

In the preceding year of 1902, the same principle had been reënforced at the very moment of the difficult negotiations with M. Concha, for the grant of the canal concession to the United States. . . . How could it be doubted that the American forces would act in the same manner one year later, at a time when Colombia had taken a decidedly hostile attitude?

No hesitation was possible. The solution had been found! The mysterious problem was solved! The final unknown quantity had been at last discovered and the equation resolved, as the French mathematicians say, in the most elegant manner.

It was no longer necessary to spend enormous sums for a useless war.

It was no longer necessary to present the impossible request for protection by American forces. Such a thing was indispensable to an insurrection covering the whole Province of Panama, but it was eliminated entirely if the insurrection was limited to the Isthmus, properly speaking.

If a revolution was started from Colon to Panama, the American forces were automatically, and without any anterior understanding, obliged to intervene.

There intervention would consist in forbidding any armed force to come within gunshot of the line of transit.
All the villages, all the houses, all the inhabitants within that zone, would immediately enjoy all necessary protection. Once such military protection was secured, the new Republic could wait.

These statements are grotesque. They hardly need refutation. We will deal with the Isthmian events of 1902 in the next two chapters which follow. Suffice it to say here that Bunau-Varilla's statement of Isthmian events in 1902 is as false as was his statement of those of 1885. There was to be no revolution in the fall of 1903. Therefore, no military preparation was necessary. If there was no military force in Colon —there was none—what justification could there be for the United States keeping out Colombian troops! Military preparation was necessary to warrant intervention on the part of the United States, if intervention could be warranted, which we deny. Uprisings had not eventuated in an independent government for the Isthmus in 1885 or 1902. Why now? The explanation of Bunau-Varilla explains altogether too much. It ignores the facts. When there is collision between facts and an explanation, it is the explanation which suffers and not the facts.

It was clearly known to Bunau-Varilla that the actual revolution was to be on the American gun-
boats. He does not tell us who told him—who gave him the assurance. His story is interesting—interesting in a way other than it was intended to be. Especially interesting is this statement to Dr. Amador:

Doctor Amador, the moment has come to clear the deck for action. Be satisfied with my assertions. There is no more time for discussing their genesis. I can give you the assurance that you will be protected by the American forces forty-eight hours after you have proclaimed the new Republic in the whole Isthmus.

That secession would be protected by American forces was communicated to Dr. Amador, a representative of the separatists, by Bunau-Varilla, as stated above. This was immediately after one of his trips to Washington. Was secession protected? This question is easily answered. It had been arranged that the Province of Panama was to declare her independence on November 4, 1903. This was actually done. The Nashville arrived at Colon on November 2. The Dixie (at Colon) and the Boston (at Panama) arrived a few days later. The telegrams to their commanders, dated November 2, 1903, quoted on an earlier page, show that the protection was furnished exactly as promised to the separatists by Bunau-Varilla.